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2. Global Problems, Complexity, 
and Civil Society in East Asia
Peter Hayes and Richard Tanter
Introduction
This chapter presents an argument about the relationship between global 
problems, complexity, problem-solving, and East Asian civil society. 
In section 1, we begin by asking two fundamental questions: what is 
specifically “global” about a global problem, and what underlies an issue 
of global concern that makes it problematic? We outline three categories of 
global problems — those that affect the sharing of global commons, those 
that affect our shared humanity, and those that rely on our shared rule 
book for regulating human activity. We conclude there is no agreement as 
to which global problems are most urgent, let alone how each fits into these 
three categories. To demonstrate the need for a consistent approach with an 
explicit method and transparent values in developing a ranking of global 
problems, we describe the effort of the World Economic Forum to generate 
a map of global risks based on the perceptions of global leaders. In turn, 
we find this effort is limited by the privileged status of the participating 
experts, and we suggest that what constitutes a global problem must 
be negotiated across national borders and political cultures. Without 
convergence towards consensus on which of these issues are truly global, 
there is no basis for agreeing on which of these problems are common to all 
countries in East Asia and which are so important they justify joint action 
in the form of shared solutions. 
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In section 2, we enter the conceptual world of complex systems. We 
argue that international security and sustainability are dimensions of 
human existence that increasingly reveal the characteristics of complex 
systems at the start of the twenty-first century rather than the relatively 
simple state of affairs that pertained in the last half of the twentieth century. 
We suggest that one of the emergent patterns of human organization in 
the region — a continuous city corridor stretching from Beijing to Tokyo 
— presents an immense challenge to the leaders of China, South Korea, 
and Japan. Inherent in that development are contradictory aspects of 
energy insecurity, urban insecurity, and nuclear insecurity, cross cut by the 
challenges of climate change and the specific threat posed by an unstable, 
declining North Korea. 
Drawing on the work of Ha Young Sun, an eminent South Korean 
political scientist, we suggest the basic approach to this increasingly 
complex set of global problems in the region is to draw on the networking 
capacities of civil society to organize transnationally across the region. We 
review the outcomes of such efforts in relation to cooperative environmental 
projects undertaken by inter-city, cross-border networks between Japan 
and China. Next, we suggest linking single-issue civil society networks to 
future networks of local governments will create resilience in the region 
and lend new capacity to framing and solving global problems in spite of 
their complexity. 
We conclude this chapter by arguing that it is central to the role of civil 
society to provide a critical perspective as to what constitutes the most 
urgent global problems that originate in or affect the region as a whole, 
rather than mirroring the priority problems set by states. Otherwise, civil 
society networks risk being entrapped in “realpolitik” zero-sum games 
rather than moving to “idealpolitik” based on cooperative strategies. 
What Are Global Problems? 
What is a global problem? This might appear obvious, but in fact, it is a 
much more difficult question to answer than one might think at first glance. 
Are they just extra-large problems, otherwise similar to complex problems 
found at the local or regional level? If they are different, even if only in scale, 
what do we have to do to solve them and how does that differ from what 
we do now? Is there an emerging field of “global problem-solving” with its 
own methods and tools? Are conceptual innovations needed to undertake 
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global problem-solving? What comprehensive approaches already exist for 
this purpose? 
The list of questions goes on. What are the implications for policy if 
global problems have special characteristics, and, if so, what are these? 
To what extent do global problems originate in this region? How are they 
manifest in this region even if they don’t originate here? And how does the 
region contribute to the solution of these problems both in the region itself 
and beyond? 
By their very nature, global problems are complex, intractable, and 
interrelated. Global problems cannot be solved sequentially, one at a time. 
Often, our best efforts to solve global problems fail or even make them 
worse. Multiple, interrelated global problems demand multiple, shared 
global solutions; they require more complex strategies and differentiated 
organizational responses. Global problems often stress our decision-making 
processes and institutional capacities beyond their limits. Consequently, such 
problems may spiral out of control, sometimes catastrophically, and often 
they persist whatever individuals and organizations do to resolve them. 
Organizations tend to focus on one problem as their core mission, 
pushing aside secondary, linked problems as less important. Individual 
humans are hard-pressed to track more than four independent variables 
at once.1 Yet we live in a seamless web of interrelated global problems, 
each of which may feed into and shape other problems. Partly because of 
this tunnel vision, we do not agree on which global problems are the most 
important, let alone on global solutions. Consequently, humanity searches 
for global solutions at cross-purposes and even in conflict. The result is 
often “global gridlock.” Meanwhile, this dissensus immobilizes the search 
for partial, multiple solutions that can be implemented at the local and 
regional level. 
In fact, global problems are not just important problems, or problems 
that affect many people. Rather, they are those problems that affect the 
whole planet, and potentially all of the people who live on it. In this 
1  “Processing loads required for the 2 x 3-way and 4-way problems differed because two 
3-way problems can be processed independently, and a solution can be stored for each, 
whereas the two halves of a 4-way problem must be processed relative to each other, 
and cannot be decomposed into separate problems. Therefore, the increase in working 
memory load from the 2 x 3-way to the 4-way problems was not simply due to the 
amount of information that was stored, but was due to the number of variables that had 
to be related in the representations of the problems…” Halford, G.S., et al., “How Many 
Variables Can Humans Process?,” Psychological Science, 16(1) (2005), doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00782.x
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sense, all global problems are local (although the reverse is not true, see 
below). Climate change is an obvious example of a truly global problem. 
The consequences of humanly-generated changes in the atmosphere will, 
albeit in different ways according to region, affect everyone on the planet. 
In other words, the consequences are universal. Moreover, unless we 
profoundly change our collective behavior, climate change may well result 
in irreversible changes in the climatic conditions of life — a measure of the 
deep vulnerability of human society in the face of this problem. 
There is no easy solution to the climate problem — it is truly intractable. 
There are many causes of climate change rooted in our economic system, our 
attitudes to nature, our political organization, our technological capacities 
and preferences, and our uses of resources. Solutions will involve all 
communities and every country; they must be collective, not just individual. 
In other words, the example of climate change suggests that global problems 
are complex, intractable, and make human society as a whole increasingly 
vulnerable. The solutions to climate change are inherently global, but in 
their archetypical form, the mitigation of greenhouse gases and adaptation 
to climate impacts will always be manifested locally and usually in ways 
tailored to local circumstances.
What, in contrast, is a strictly local problem? These are problems that 
are local in origin and solution and do not require global governance 
for resolution. Since the mid-sixties, for example, environmental 
organizations have existed almost everywhere. They work on local 
ecological problems such as habitat loss, land and forest rights, or 
environmental pollution.2 Many of these groups are now networked 
transnationally across borders, some of them globally, to address “glocal” 
problems — problems that are universal but are regulated locally, not 
globally — in contrast to truly global problems, such as restoration and 
preservation of the ozone layer.3
Such problems for the most part are truly local, not global problems, no 
matter how widespread the issue. Usually, the cause is local (that is, national 
or smaller in scale and sub-national in terms of the governance level). Unless 
the problem arises from some international connection, such as foreign 
2  Hayes, P., The Potential for Environmental Action: Report to the UNEP (Geneva: NGO 
Environment Liaison Board, 1976).
3  Lopez, G., A., et al., “The Global Tide,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51(4) (1995).
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investment in a polluting factory (as at Bhopal) or a transnational criminal 
gang dumping toxic wastes (as in Somalia), the solution is primarily local. By 
the widely accepted principle of subsidiarity, the responsibility for solving 
a problem should be pushed to the lowest level possible in the institutional 
context where the problem demands resolution. Of course, at some point, 
the local problem becomes so internationalized that it becomes truly 
global in scope and scale—and today at least seven types of international 
environmental crimes exist.4 Thus, the status of a problem is dynamic. With 
time, local problems may become global, both quantitatively and qualitatively 
and, typically, will exist on a local-global spectrum rather than at one or the 
other end of the scale.
Rischard’s Top Twenty Taxonomy 
One way to define and categorize “inherently global” problems is shown 
in Table 2.1. As Jean-Francois Rischard explains in High Noon: Twenty Global 
Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them:
Roughly a third of these have to do with how we share our planet (burning 
environmental issues); another third of which relate to how we share 
our humanity (urgent economic and social issues requiring a worldwide 
coalition for their effective solution); with a final third having to do with 
how we share our rulebook (important regulatory challenges urgently 
requiring a minimum critical mass of global rules to prevent free-riding and 
other negative consequences).5
We believe this taxonomy of global problems is powerful, although as 
we will see below, Rischard’s “top twenty” list of global problems may 
be too narrow or inadequate. For example, not listed is a truly global 
and intractable global problem that originates in and affects East Asia 
in profound ways (see chapter 5 of this book): the risk of next-use and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
4  “They include: illegal trade in wildlife; smuggling of ozone depleting substances (ODS); 
illicit trade in hazardous waste; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and illegal 
logging and the associated trade in stolen timber,” in Banks, D., et al., Environmental 
Crime, a Threat to Our Future (London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2008).
5  Rischard, J.F., High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002).
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Table 2.1: Taxonomy of Twenty Global Issues 
Global Commons 
“Sharing the Planet: Issues involving the global commons”
1. Global warming 
2. Biodiversity and ecosystem losses
3. Fisheries depletion
4. Deforestation 
5. Water deficits
6. Maritime safety and pollution
Global Commitments 
“Sharing our Humanity: Issues whose size and urgency requires a global 
commitment”
7. Massive step-up in fight against poverty
8. Peacekeeping, conflict prevention, combating terrorism
9. Education for all
10. Global infectious diseases
11. Digital divide
12. Natural disaster prevention and mitigation
Global Regulatory Approach 
“Sharing our Rulebook: Issues needing a global regulatory approach”
13. Reinventing taxation 
14. Biotechnology rules 
15. Global financial architecture
16. Illegal drugs
17. Trade, investment, competition rules 
18. Intellectual property rights 
19. E-commerce rules
20. International labor and migration rules
Source: J. Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), p. 66.
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The Nature of Global Problems 
In addition to falling into one of these three categories, global problems 
exhibit a number of characteristics that make them global rather than 
national or local in nature. Global problems may exhibit linkage between 
cause and effect across societal levels from global to local. Global 
problems also separate cause and effect when the driving forces are 
highly centralized and concentrated both institutionally and spatially 
and, therefore, are distant or even invisible to most of humanity who 
nonetheless experience the effects. Other global problems are the result 
of highly distributed and decentralized driving forces so diffuse yet 
cumulatively powerful that the resulting overall impact is qualitatively 
transformative even though it passes unnoticed except at the local level. 
The global financial collapse is an example of the former; the ozone hole 
is an example of the latter. 
Often, global problems are multi-dimensional and drive pervasive 
change propelled by interrelationships across superficially segmented 
problems or disparate issues or levels of governance. Global problems may 
be the result of multi-directional causes that erupt suddenly from below 
or without warning from above a specific level or location in the global 
hierarchy of place (extra-national, national, subnational, local, individual) 
and organization (UN Security Council, regional government unions, 
nation states, provincial and state governments, local governments, 
cities and villages, associations). Sometimes, events in one society arc 
around the planet to jolt another, thereby dramatically changing both 
their trajectories — a phenomenon that James Rosenau calls “distant 
proximities.” 6 Acts of mass terror by non-state actors exemplify this kind 
of global problem. Political scientists have observed such turbulence for 
decades,7 but have not contributed significantly to our understanding of 
the origins or outcomes of such sudden, discontinuous, and often non-
linear changes in world affairs. 
The impact of some global problems may not be felt for years or 
decades, whereas decision-making time horizons for actions that 
contribute to or resolve these problems are relatively short. Such enduring 
6  Rosenau, J.N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990).
7  Ernst Haas was an exception, with his early contribution: Haas, E.B., “Turbulent Fields 
and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization, 30(02) (1976), doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018245
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global problems may set severe limits on solving interrelated, medium-
term global problems. Some solutions may turn out to generate further 
problems. These attributes and perceptions of global problems are an 
enormous challenge to traditional organizations, especially those that 
are state-based, which typically are slow to recognize problems and even 
slower to respond.
Disaggregating a Global Problem
Complex global problems often appear to be rigid, opaque, and immune to 
human agency. At the risk of losing sight of the whole, therefore, it is useful 
to decompose such mega-problems into constituent problems. 
As a global problem, the weapons-of-mass-destruction or “WMD” issue 
is enormously complex. Solving it entails a great deal of regulation of human 
behavior. Failure to control it could result in crimes against humanity on 
a massive scale, to the point where it threatens human existence as well as 
global ecological integrity. In Rischard’s framework, it is a global problem 
that falls into all three categories. Thus, many distinct, linked, global 
problems are tied together in this instance into a rigid “mega-problem.” 
In the case of nuclear weapons, researchers at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace unpackaged the global nuclear weapons problem 
into its constituent problem drivers and possible “solution strategies” 
(see chapter 5). They identified four key drivers — terrorism, new states, 
existing arsenals, and regime breakdown — each of which had four distinct 
sub-problems, generating no fewer than sixteen distinct possible ways 
in which East Asia might contribute to the global problem — including 
North Korea, nuclear threats, nuclear black markets, and the collapse of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
On the solution-strategy side of the nuclear weapons problem, they 
outlined six obligations (no easy exit, devalue weapons, secure materials, 
stop transfers, resolve conflicts, deal with the four nuclear-armed states 
outside of the NPT), each of which contains multiple possible strategies 
for a total of twenty possible ways that regional action in East Asia could 
contribute to the solution of the global problem.8 Overall, the drivers and 
solutions present no fewer than thirty-six possible links between the global 
8  Perkovich, G., et al., Universal Compliance, a Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).
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and regional dimensions of the nuclear weapons problem. Of these, at least 
fifteen of the sixteen nuclear weapons threats and at least fourteen of the 
solution strategies pertain to East Asia. Thus, the regional dimension of the 
global nuclear weapons problem is only marginally less complex (twenty-
eight out of thirty-six) than the full-blown global WMD problem. Whether 
global or regional, the overall level of complexity in either case far exceeds 
human comprehension. 
In this book, we will use a similar process of disaggregation into 
constituent, separate, but linked problems to approach and comprehend 
the daunting complexity of climate change, urban insecurity, energy 
insecurity, and weapons of mass destruction.
Contested Nature of Global Problems
If there is no definitive, authoritative list and priority ranking of global 
problems, how does civil society determine which global problems are 
most important in East Asia, and which of these are in turn amenable to 
solutions, in what combinations and sequencing? 
One approach to setting this agenda was taken by the United Nations 
(UN) in 2000 when it adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
These eight anti-poverty goals were to eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality 
and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; 
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental 
sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.9 More 
than a decade later, significant progress has been made to fulfill some of 
these goals, but we are lagging behind several of them. And while these 
goals are challenging, they do not capture the full range of obstacles 
and threats that obstruct them, let alone the full array of security and 
sustainability problems that are truly global in scope, many of which afflict 
this region. 
Is it true, as the United Nations appears to assume, that overcoming 
global poverty entails solving all the other critical global problems that 
could lead humanity over a cliff of unsustainable insecurity and disorder? 
Although overcoming global poverty is central to fulfilling our shared 
9  The Millennium Development Goals (New York: United Nations Development 
Programme), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals.
html
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humanity, it is not clear that doing so would suffice to resolve all the 
problems afflicting the global commons, nor to complete the agenda of 
problems related to achieving equitable, just development of all humans, 
let alone to regulate all behaviors that could lead to global problems. Other 
global problems would still be universal, have global impact, and would be 
inescapable, for example, energy use leading to irreversible climate change 
that reduces food security. Nor would overcoming global poverty suffice 
to instigate all the behaviors needed to create global public goods (such as 
open, transparent government processes at every level). 
At the other end of the spectrum of specificity we find that the Union of 
International Associations (UIA) empirically documents at least 170 basic 
universal problems (such as danger, lack of information, social injustice, 
war, environmental degradation).10 These high-level problems are defined 
by the UIA as difficulties
of such proportions and complexity that no single organization or discipline 
can claim to encompass any one of them in all its aspects. The scope and 
implications of such problems tends to be a matter of continuing debate. 
They are not sufficiently well defined to respond to well-defined solutions. 
The nature of an appropriate solution to such problems is also a matter of 
continuing debate.11 
Another source for determining the possible priority of problems would be 
global civil society. Many international think-tanks offer their own laundry 
lists of priority global problems that form the foci of their research. The 
Brookings Institution, for example, offers a list of seventeen global issues, 
only nine of which wholly or partly overlap with Rischard’s list and only 
three of which partly or wholly overlap with the eight MDGs.12 Similarly, 
10  In addition, UIA 1994 update identified a further set of 575 cross-sectoral problems 
(such as animal suffering, irresponsible nationalism, soil degradation), 2,162 
detailed problems (such as epidemics, white-collar crime), 3,857 emanations of 
other problems (such as terrorism targeted against tourists, injustice of mass trials), 
3,072 fuzzy exceptional problems (such as blaming victims, pacifism, unconstrained 
free trade), 2,153 very specific problems (such as blue baby), 214 problems under 
consideration for inclusion (such as feminist backlash, mudslide), for a total of 
9,832 world problems. See Union of International Associations, Encyclopedia of 
World Problems and Human Potential. 3 vols (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1994). Encyclopedia 
of World Problems and Human Potential (Wikipedia), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Encyclopedia_of_World_Problems_and_Human_Potential
11  Basic Universal Problems (Brussels: Union of International Associations), http://www.
uia.be/node/328165 
12  Namely, communications, corruption, crime, development assistance, economics 
(global finance international trade), environment (nature conservation, environment: 
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Rischard’s list contains partial or complete overlap with the MDGs (7/8), but 
these constitute only a third (7/20) of his top twenty global problems. Thus, 
there is simply no consensus in global civil society as to what constitutes 
the core set of global problems.
Shifting levels, one could seek instead to identify a set of shared priority 
economic and security concerns from the agendas of the leading Asian-
Pacific regional organizations, assuming these reflect the priorities of the 
participating states, and further assuming that regional and national civil 
society follows suit. For example, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the members of which are “economies,” not states, promotes 
free trade and economic cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 
Its convening and dialogic activities encompass a wide range of topics on 
competition policy, commercial law, trade, and investment issues (such as 
market access and business mobility). It also holds senior official meetings 
on sectoral-level economic and technical cooperation with specific attention 
to terrorism, gender issues, mining points of contention, and an array of ad 
hoc themes such as sustainable development, free trade agreements, and 
bio-technology.13
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) addresses a range of regional security 
issues and promotes dialogue at an official level.14 The Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) convenes “Track 2” study groups15 
pollution), global commons (oceans, Antarctica, atmosphere and outer space), health, 
human rights, labor rights, refugee protection and assistance, violence: intrastate 
conflict, warfare (conventional weapons, nuclear, biological, chemical weapons). 
See Simmons, P.J. and de Jonge Oudraat, C., Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).
13  See Wesley, M., The Regional Organizations of the Asia Pacific: Exploring Institutional 
Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
14  ASEAN Regional Forum official activities cover confidence building measures; 
peacekeeping; search, rescue and disaster relief; defense; counter-terrorism; non-
traditional security; maritime security; WMD proliferation; preventive diplomacy; 
small arms and light weapons; energy security; shipboard waste disposal; economic 
security; and eminent persons. See List of Track II Activities 1994-2012 (Jakarta: ASEAN 
Regional Forum), http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-activities/list-of-arf-
track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year.html 
15  As of May 2011, CSCAP working groups were (with Asia-Pacific wide scope): 
Cybersecurity, Water Resources Security, Responsibility to Protect, Naval 
Enhancement, Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, Regional 
Transnational Organised Crime Hubs, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, Export Controls; and sub-regionally, Multilateral Security 
Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific. Already concluded working group topics 
covered: Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation, Facilitating Maritime 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (specifically, Safety and Security in the Malacca 
and Singapore Straits, and a Legal experts group), Future Prospects for Multilateral 
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that often mirror the foci of the ARF.16 The ASEAN Plus 3 (China, South 
Korea, and Japan) is an extension of the ARF process that began in 1997 and 
tries to develop cooperation between the member states that spans cultural, 
economic, functional, political, security, and social areas.17 Likewise, CSCAP 
has also convened a sub-regional working group on Multilateral Security 
Governance in Northeast Asia and the North Pacific. 
These regional concerns are listed at a high level of generality, however, 
and there is no more than a loose convergence of views represented in 
these fora. Although they show what issues national elites in the whole 
Asia-Pacific want to talk about, none of these regional organizations entail 
substantive commitments. No state in the region relies on them to preserve 
their vital national security and sustainability interests. 
At the sub-regional level of “low politics” a set of Northeast Asian 
environmental inter-ministerial18 and senior official meetings19 have focused 
on critical environmental oceanic and land-based issues, but none of these 
dialogues have led to any concrete cooperation or collaboration.20 At the 
level of high politics, the Six Party Talks addressed the specific issue of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Again, to date the Talks have achieved 
nothing but acrimony, nuclear tests, and the isolation of North Korea. 
Scholars have also tackled interrelated global problems in East Asia 
under the rubric of “human security.” For example, Tsuneo Akaha 
examines three global insecurities arising from the extent to which the 
Security Frameworks in Northeast Asia; Human Trafficking; Regional Peacekeeping 
and Peacebuilding; Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign against International 
Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region; Preventive Diplomacy; 
Oceania; Energy Security; and Security Implications for Climate Change. See Study 
Groups (Kuala Lumpur: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), http://
www.cscap.org/index.php?page=study-groups; Concluded Working and Study Groups 
(Kuala Lumpur: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), http://www.
cscap.org/index.php?page=concluded-working-and-study-grups
16  List of Track II Activities 1994-2012 ; ibid.; ibid.
17  See ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, 2012), http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean- 
plus-three-cooperation
18  The 13th Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among Korea, China and Japan 
since they began in 1999 was held April 29, 2011 in Korea. See The 13th Tripartite 
Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM13) (Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting), 
http://www.temm.org/sub05/view.jsp?id=20
19  The 14th Senior Officials Meeting since they began in 1993 was held on April 8-9, 2009, 
in Russia. See Key Outcomes of Soms: Som-14 (8-9 April 2009; Moscow, Russian Federation) 
(Incheon: North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation), 
http://www.neaspec.org/key-outcomes-soms 
20  Jho, W. and Lee, H., “The Structure and Political Dynamics of Regulating ‘Yellow Sand’ 
in Northeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, 33(2) (2009). 
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countries of the region have failed to embrace global norms regarding the 
rights of groups of individuals, namely humans trafficked for exploitation, 
migrant workers, and persons living with HIV and AIDS patients. He and 
other scholars conclude that a common obstacle to addressing these global 
problems as manifested in East Asia is the lack of common principles and 
regulations concerning the treatment of border-crossing mobile individuals 
who embody each of these pressing issues.21 Others have tackled further 
human security issues in the region such as the role and status of women 
and the realization of human rights.22 Yet another, more critical angle of 
approach investigates the existential sources of insecurity experienced by 
the peoples living within this region: demographic pressures, resource 
limitations, ecological degradation, food politics, identity challenges, 
health threats, and political change.23 
Identifying Linkages
We argued above that civil society networks are particularly good at 
identifying links between global problems and solutions. However, doing 
so is not easy. As Jared Diamond points out, they are linked in complex 
and often unrecognized ways. He lists twelve problems that lead to 
“unsustainability” and notes that while these problems appear to be 
separate,
[T]hey are linked: one problem exacerbates another or makes its solution more 
difficult. For example, population growth affects all eleven other problems; 
more people means more deforestation, more toxic chemicals, more demand 
for wild fish, etc. The energy problem is linked to other problems because 
use of fossil fuels for energy contributes heavily to greenhouse gases, the 
combating of soil fertility losses by using synthetic fertilizers requires 
energy to make the fertilizers, fossil fuel scarcity increases our interest in 
nuclear energy which poses potentially the biggest “toxic” problem of all in 
case of an accident, and fossil fuel scarcity also makes it more expensive to 
21  Akaha, T., “Human Security in East Asia: Embracing Global Norms through Regional 
Cooperation in Human Trafficking, Labour Migration, and HIV/AIDS,” Journal of Human 
Security, 5(2) (2009), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3316/JHS0502011. See also Vassilieva, 
A. and Akaha, T., Crossing National Borders Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx
?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=148044 
22  See, for example, UNESCO, “Human Security in East Asia,” in International Conference 
on Human Security in East Asia (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 
2003).
23  Renwick, N., Northeast Asian Critical Security: Exploring Democratic Freedoms and Social 
Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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solve our freshwater problems by using energy to desalinize ocean water. 
Depletion of fisheries and other wild food sources puts more pressure on 
livestock, crops, and aquaculture to replace them, thereby leading to more 
topsoil losses and more eutrophication from agriculture and aquaculture. 
Problems of deforestation, water shortage, and soil degradation in the Third 
World foster wars there and drive legal asylum seekers and illegal emigrants 
to the First World from the Third World.24
This interlinking of issues, or complex interdependency of problems, has 
implications for both the way we think about these issues — our forms of 
knowledge — and the way we might start to solve them. Diamond remarks:
People often ask, “What is the single most important environmental 
problem facing the world today?” A flip answer would be, “The single most 
important problem is our misguided focus on identifying the single most 
important problem!” That flip answer is essentially correct, because any of 
the dozen problems, if unsolved, would do us grave harm, and because they 
all interact with each other. If we solved eleven of the problems, but not the 
12th, we would still be in trouble, whichever was the problem that remained 
unsolved. We have to solve them all.25
Some international agencies have attempted to map the specific links 
between the global problems that they tackle. In 2004, for example, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) recognized it was missing opportunities 
to exploit synergies and complementarities between their different projects 
on biodiversity, climate change, international waters, persistent organic 
particulates, integrated ecosystem management, and land degradation. It 
was ignoring the negative impacts arising from duplicated and incomplete 
work because linkages were not taken into account in project design and 
implementation.26 In an important study for the emerging field of global 
problem-solving, undertaken for the GEF by its Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Panel (STAP), the GEF called attention to four distinct types of 
linkages that were identified in its funded projects. These were: 
Key Linkages (blue), for example:
•  Climate change and biodiversity, land and water degradation
•  Land degradation and biodiversity
•  Water degradation and biodiversity
24  Diamond, J.M., Collapse : How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005).
25  Ibid., p. 498.
26  Anderson, D., et al., A Conceptual Design Tool for Exploiting Interlinkages between the Focal 
Areas of the GEF, GEF working paper (Washington, DC: Global Environment Facility, 2004).
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Intermediate Linkages (light blue), for example:
•  Effect of land degradation on water bodies and vice versa, disrupting 
the hydrological cycle and leading to declining productivity and 
food insecurity, accentuated poverty, and social instability 
•  Effect of Persistent Organic Pollutants on biodiversity due to major 
impact on species and ecosystems
Weak Linkages (green), for example:
•  Effect of land degradation and biodiversity on climate change via 
changes in albedo and decreasing carbon sequestration 
 Multiple (3-4 way) Interactions, for example:
•  Climate change and variability affect biodiversity (at genetic, 
species and ecosystem levels), land degradation, hydrological 
cycles, thus also influencing surface, ground, and international 
waters — possibly all at the same time27
Of the 119 GEF projects reviewed by the STAP, only one-fifth of the project 
documents revealed any recognition by GEF of the existence of these links 
in the underlying problems and their causal factors, and only nine tried 
to exploit these links in project design.28 On the solution side, that is, the 
intended outcome of projects in the GEF focal areas, the STAP identified 
ways in which the projects could have positive or negative impacts on 
projects in other focal areas. In the case of establishing and managing 
protected areas, for example, the projects were found to have positive 
effects on climate change by increased carbon storage when previously 
overexploited habitats are restored, but negative effects on climate change 
if the protected areas displace human populations and/or brings tourists to 
the area, which can further degrade it. 
The GEF recommended each project identify these links between causal 
factors and the positive and negative linkages in their strategies. In addition, 
each project was told to take specific measures to reduce vulnerability to 
neglecting these links. In the case of protected areas, this approach means 
ensuring that protected areas include buffer zones and corridors to link 
separated areas, for example. GEF is one of the few international agencies 
to explicitly address the issue of linkages between problems and solutions 
in their project design — although effective implementation is another 
question. (The UN Environment Programme has also addressed this issue 
27  Ibid., pp. 14-19.
28  Ibid., p. 22.
28 Complexity, Security, And Civil Society In East Asia
by creating an “Interlinkages Unit” that attempts to strengthen interlinkages 
and promote synergies across multilateral environmental conventions.29 
We are not aware of a similar study of inter-linkages applicable to the work 
of civil society organizations and networks, although some metrics exist to 
determine the performance of networks independent of their contribution 
to the resolution of global problems). Some of the GEF’s framework is 
usable in a civil society context — the notions of key, intermediate, and 
weak linkages, cross-problem impacts of solution strategies, etc. But the 
lack of scholarly work in this field is striking, given the scale of international 
civil society activity and interventions on specific problems. It appears 
that practitioners responding to real-world crises in intergovernmental 
organizations may be the most important source of knowledge in the 
field of global problem-solving. Although not reviewed here in detail, the 
Nexus Network, established in the UK in 2014, attempts to distil lessons 
learned about such linkages among problems — in this case water, food, 
energy, environment, and in some cases climate. These interlinkages were 
perceived by development agencies to be critically important in 2009 after 
the food and energy crises of 2007 and 2008.30
World Economic Forum Global Risk Taxonomy
In 2005, the World Economic Forum (WEF) developed a new taxonomy 
of global problems under the rubric of “global” risk. In its first of a series 
of annual reports, the WEF listed thirty-six global risks, which it classified 
into four categories: economic, geopolitical, societal, and environmental. 
From this list, the WEF focused on ten risks most likely to have a “major 
or extreme impact on business.” These were instability in Iraq, terrorism, 
emerging fiscal crises, disruption in oil supplies, radical Islam, sudden 
decline in China’s growth, pandemics and infectious diseases, climate 
change, weapons of mass destruction, and unrestrained migration and 
related tensions.31 
29  Gitay, H., et al., “Interlinkages: Governance for Sustainability, Section D: Human 
Dimensions of Environmental Change” in Global Environmental Outlook GEO 4 (Kenya: 
United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). 
30  See The Nexus Network (Brighton: The Nexus Network), http://thenexusnetwork.org/ 
Allouche, J., “Does the Nexus Mask a Bigger Debate? Rethinking the Food-Energy-Water 
Nexus and a Low Water Economy,” Knowledge, Technology and Society, 21 March 2014, http://
www.water-energy-food.org/en/news/view__1607/does-the-nexus-mask-a-bigger-
debate.html?-rethinking-the-food-energy-water-nexus-and-a-low-water-economy
31  World Economic Forum in collaboration and Merrill Lynch, Global Risks to the Business 
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In 2006, the WEF reduced the list to twenty-five global risks, but 
added technological risks to the taxonomy. At this point, the dangers 
were identified by commissioned individual, scholarly, and corporate risk 
analysts.32 In 2007, the WEF increased the number of “core” risks to twenty-
seven, a precursor of what was called “clusters” and then “Centres of 
Gravity,” that is, global risks that are highly interconnected with other risks 
of great consequence. The WEF also introduced a “risk barometer” that 
year to measure the probability, impact, and trend of each risk (measured 
in potential economic damage, growth loss as per cent of global GDP, and 
mortalities) and a measure of the degree of correlation between them.33 
In the 2008 report, the WEF made the concept of global risk more 
granular and explicit. The WEF explained that it separated identifiable 
trends (“observable facts in the contemporary world”), issues of concern 
(“potential challenges which arise from those trends”), and risks (“specific 
realizations of those challenges in a format which is sufficiently specific 
to be open to a level of assessment in terms of relative severity and 
likelihood, without being so specific as to preclude them as a basis for 
decision-making”). In some domains, the WEF noted that the trends-issues 
of concern-risks pathway is clear. “In others, notably geopolitical risk,” the 
WEF observed, “the pathway from trend to risk is less clear, contingency 
is greater and common issues can manifest in many different ways.”34 
Thus, whereas for economic global risks, there were six trends, six issues of 
concern, and six risks, for geopolitics, there were seven trends, nine issues 
of concern, and twelve risks to track. 
In the 2008 report, the assessments were still based on expert groups. 
Some of the thirty-one risks listed such as natural catastrophe were assessed 
using actuarial data. Others, geopolitical risks in particular, required 
additional, disaggregated assessment by specialists. Consequently, the 
WEF allowed for a wider range of possible outcomes on the latter types of 
global risk and correspondingly higher levels of uncertainty.35 
In 2009, the WEF added new depth to their evolving taxonomy. This 
time, as the global financial crisis took grip, they listed thirty-six global risks. 
Environment, 2005 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2005). 
32  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2006 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2006).
33  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2007, a Global Risk Network Report (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2007). 
34  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2008, a Global Risk Network Report (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2008).
35  Ibid., p. 45. 
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For the first time, the WEF defined global risk (see Table 2.2). To qualify, the 
WEF stated, a global risk must have the following attributes at a global or 
supra-regional level: pervasive economic impacts, high uncertainty as to its 
general impact, a risk of no less than $10 billion, and a multi-stakeholder 
approach to risk mitigation given the complex linkages with other risks.36
Table 2.2: WEF Definition of Global Risk 
Global Scope: To be considered global, a risk should have the potential to affect 
(including both primary and secondary impact) at least three world regions on at 
least two different continents. While these risks may have regional or even local 
origin, their impact can potentially be felt globally.
Cross-Industry Relevance: The risk has to affect three or more industries 
(including both primary and secondary impact).
Uncertainty: There is uncertainty about how the risk manifests itself within 10 
years combined with uncertainty about the magnitude of its impact (assessed in 
terms of likelihood and severity).
Economic Impact: The risk has the potential to cause economic damage of around 
US$ 10 billion.
Public Impact: The risk has the potential to cause major human suffering and to 
trigger considerable public pressure and global policy responses.
Multi-stakeholder Approach: The complexity of the risk, both in terms of its 
effects and its drivers as well as its inter-linkages with other risks, requires a 
multi-stakeholder approach for its mitigation.
Source: World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2009, a Global Risk Network Report (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2009), p. 32. 
Unlike previous catalogues of global problems, the WEF’s definition can be 
used to determine if a specific problem qualifies as “global” based on the 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the risk it presents. There is 
still a substantial overlap with older taxonomies and catalogues, however, 
especially with regard to the “mega-problems” or “core problems” 
identified by earlier studies. 
The WEF also began to map the interconnections between risks, drawing 
on a survey initially limited to experts. By 2012, it had surveyed more than 
1,000 participants in the WEF from all regions and cultures of the world 
36  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2009, a Global Risk Network Report (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2009). 
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for estimates of the degree of correlation and level of risk associated with 
a trend. Of course, this is not a representative sample in any respect. Those 
surveyed were mostly privileged, wealthy transnational leaders from 
market and public sectors (with a sprinkling from the “social” sector). But 
they surely constitute a relatively well-informed group alert to trends that 
might affect business or the exercise of power and, therefore, a priori more 
likely to be scanning the global risk horizon than most people on the planet. 
The empirical basis of the risk assessment and linkage also allowed 
the WEF to break down their results on a regional basis. They found that 
Asian countries “are much more diverse with respect to their exposures to 
economic risks, but comparatively tightly clustered — however at a higher 
median risk level — when it comes to the geopolitical and environmental 
risk dimensions.”37 Moreover, most Asian economies “are heavily exposed 
to a hard landing in China. Asia is also subject to risks related to the price of 
oil, dollar fluctuations, and a retrenchment from globalization.”38
In 2011, the WEF introduced three new elements. These were “cross-
cutting global risks,” “the nexus between risks,” and “risks to watch.” 
Cross-cutting risks “are especially significant given their high degrees 
of impact and interconnectedness [that] influence the evolution of many 
other global risks and inhibit our capacity to respond effectively to them” 
(in 2009, economic disparity and the failure of global governance were 
highlighted).39 These nexuses are clusters of emerging risks (in 2009, the 
WEF identified three such emergent nexuses, “macroeconomic imbalances,” 
“illegal economy,” and the “water-food-energy” nexus). A separate set of 
“risks to watch” were also identified in 2009 through the combination of 
survey responses with expert opinion indicating that these risks may have 
“severe, unexpected or underappreciated consequences” (such as cyber-
security issues ranging from cyber theft to all-out cyber warfare). 40
The 2012 report added another characterization to its mapping of the 
linkages between risks. Previously, the WEF identified five “centers of 
gravity” in each of the categories of problems, these being “the risks of 
greatest systemic importance, or the most influential and consequential in 
relation to others” (in 2012, they were chronic fiscal imbalances, greenhouse 
gas emissions, global governance failure, unsustainable population growth, 
37  Ibid., p. 8.
38  Ibid., p. 10.
39  Ibid., p. 6. 
40  Ibid. 
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and critical systems failure).41 The WEF then pinpointed four global risks 
that were most connected across these global risk “centers of gravity.” (In 
2012, all of these were economic in nature, namely, severe income disparity, 
major systemic financial failure, unforeseen negative consequences of 
regulation, and extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices).42 
Arguably, these critical connectors are the most powerful leverage 
point in this “ecology” of risk-generating problems. The 2013 report 
supplemented this with an additional set of five “X Factors” or wild cards 
that look beyond the fifty known problems with potentially massive 
impact over the next decade to survey as yet almost unknown problems, 
issues that have the potential to emerge rapidly and “change the game.” 
(In 2013, the X Factors were runaway climate change, significant cognitive 
enhancement, rogue deployment of geo-engineering, costs of living longer, 
and discovery of alien life.)43 
In 2009, the WEF had already shifted from a quantitative definition of risk 
to a more qualitative one: “an occurrence that causes significant negative 
impact for several countries and industries.”44 In 2014, the WEF used this 
definition to winnow down the list to thirty-one leading global threats.45 
It made this change because the quantitative valuations of risk inevitably 
involved many assumptions, could not account for a range of valuations for 
a specific risk, and could not be estimated at all for some risks such as loss 
of biodiversity or climate change.46 Instead, the WEF relied primarily on 
surveys of perception of the leading risks in terms of possible impact and 
probability, with all the attendant problems of cognitive bias, etc. The 2014 
report therefore identified the perceptual differences revealed by gender 
(women were found to be more sensitive to impact than men) and by age 
(the young were found to attribute higher impact to environmental and 
social risks such as the fiscal crisis than older respondents, for example).47 
It also showed that, in terms of probability and impact of risk, the WEF’s 
“top ten” evolves fast —faster, in fact, than the underlying real phenomena 
could possibly change. This is evidence, therefore, that the WEF risk indices 
41  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2012 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2012).
42  Ibid., p. 14. 
43  World Economic Forum, et al., Global Risks 2013 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2013).
44  World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2014, Insight Report (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum).
45  Ibid., p. 55.
46  Ibid., p. 49.
47  Ibid., p. 19.
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are driven by factors that rapidly affect perception (such as “global events” 
that generate massive media and Internet exposure). In 2014, the WEF also 
distinguished between risks and vulnerabilities, which they suggest are 
really trends that portend the emergence of a risk.
In 2014, the WEF also introduced the notion of “systemic risks.” These 
are risks that transcend national boundaries, involve shared resources, and 
exhibit causality that is “indirect and time-delayed.” Such systemic risks 
resist technical fixes and require changes to the behavior of those involved.48 
The WEF examined three such systemic risks (instability in a multipolar 
world, the lost generation growing up with poor prospects, and digital 
disintegration) and argued that unless all stakeholders are engaged in joint 
problem-solving, each of these risks may overwhelm humanity.49 They 
noted that failing global governance may be replaced by an “intricate lattice 
of multiple, interconnected government agreements related to relatively 
simple global goals,” leaving it to collaborative alliances, partnerships, and 
localities to figure out how to deliver solutions commensurate with the 
scale of the problem.50
We focus on the WEF framework because it is the first detailed 
description of global problems and solutions (in their parlance, “global 
risks and mitigation strategies”) that describe the terrain of global problems 
(“risk landscape”) and populates it with empirical content, expert opinion, 
and survey data of risk perception. Admittedly, this approach is based 
primarily on the perceptions of a privileged community of corporate leaders 
and closely-related expert communities. Another global community — for 
example, ecological and climate specialists, or development and human 
rights practitioners — might generate a different top fifty list of global 
risks, centers of gravity of clustered risks, critical connecting risks, risks 
to watch, systemic risks, and wild card risks. Indeed, this is observable 
already in the problems that are highlighted in the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals. Nonetheless, the WEF framework is a 
powerful navigation tool that can provide useful insight into interrelated 
global problems and shared solutions in a policy framework that can then 
be implemented in tangible, specific ways. 
48  Ibid., p. 27. This section of the report drew on the conceptual work on “global systemic 
risk” advanced in Goldin, I. and Mariathasan, M., The Butterfly Defect, How Globalization 
Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014).
49  World Economic Forum (2014).
50  Ibid., p. 22.
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In 2008, the WEF suggested that nations create country risk officers 
to respond both to risks that are displaced across borders and over time 
onto vulnerable communities (a process of so-called “squeezing” in 
WEF parlance) and to risks that are becoming more homogenous across 
countries. Examples include the universality of “lifestyle” diseases formerly 
limited to OECD countries or exposure to pandemics that cross borders in 
hours and days due to the velocity and breadth of human mobility. The 
WEF proposed the creation of a forum of country risk officers or agencies 
to overcome fragmented accountability for managing these risks, and to 
devise coalitions for tackling collaborative mitigation of risk squeezing and 
risk homogeneity.51
In a multi-year process beginning in 2009 and involving nearly 200 young 
leaders, the World Economic Forum investigated how to craft practical 
interventions in twenty “issues” covering ten “areas of enquiry” such as 
education, energy, and health, issues which could also be termed complex 
global problems.52 They set out to identify positive feedback in the causal loop 
diagrams they visualized for each issue area. Such feedback could destabilize 
the entire issue area — or those linked to it — with runaway negative and 
positive feedback loops. Each group worked to identify interventions that 
would lend stability to their issue area, and in some cases, to multiple issue 
areas at a time. They recommended that not only the immediate effects of 
interventions should be considered, but also possible delayed second-order 
effects53 They advised that intervention choices to induce constructive 
change should emerge through this mapping and testing process, stating 
“By exploring several levels of effects and influences, patterns emerged that 
indicated areas of leverage (many connections converging on one point) 
or root causes, which could spin a situation out of balance. By creating a 
broader, non-linear picture of your situation of interest, a more nuanced 
approach to intervention can be plotted.”54
They then described case studies and interventions made by the young 
leaders such as proposed increases in transparency of governance, new uses 
of social media, and highly adapted and localized technological innovations. 
As Michael Drexler observed, all twenty loop diagrams generated by the 
51  World Economic Forum, et al. (2008); World Economic Forum (2014).
52  World Economic Forum, “Young Global Leaders: Guide to Influencing Complex 
Systems,” in The Forum of Young Global Leaders (Nuevo Vallarta: World Economic 
Forum, 2012).
53  Ibid., pp. 7-9.
54  Ibid., p. 9. 
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groups contained potentially destabilizing feedback loops, endowing each 
system with the potential to “blow up.”55 He noted how multiplier nodes 
often sit within each positive feedback loop, many of which are common to 
different complex systems and may be key to stabilizing the system once 
technical silos within each system are connected — for example, connecting 
popular mass media with specialist media in a given issue area. Drexler also 
noted that “meta-interventions” might work across different systems such 
as designing appropriate incentive schemes to overcome short versus long-
term or local versus national versus global stabilizing outcomes. Finally, he 
concluded that as the systems are interconnected, interventions within each 
system will affect other systems. Thus, “An intervention to appropriately 
value natural resources, for example, will need at least collaboration, if not 
a reinforcing intervention, from financial services.”56
It follows, Drexler asserts, that one must remove “the worst distortions 
first before the ‘softer’ measures can be given a chance to stabilize the 
system. One without the other will not work.”57 Given the exercise began by 
recognizing that what appears at first to be a cause of one issue may, in a set 
of interdependencies, be a symptom of another,58 Drexler leaves open the 
question of how the “worst distortions” are best identified for intervention 
before other distortions. Despite this lacuna, the WEF’s attempt to create an 
applied methodology to identify specific interventions — many of which 
have been implemented since 2009 — is an important methodological 
achievement in the field of global problem-solving.
In 2013, the WEF focused on how to build resilience at the national level 
to manage many disparate but linked risks in the form of action narratives. 
The WEF observed that it felt obliged to develop such narratives due to 
complexity: “The 50 global risks in this report are interdependent and 
correlated with each other. The permutations of two, three, four or more risks 
are too many for the human mind to comprehend. Therefore, an analysis of 
the network of connections has been undertaken to highlight some interesting 
constellations of global risks.”59 A subset of these constellations was selected, 
and an “action narrative” around each of these cases was developed to help 
leaders understand the risk, make them aware of the true complexity of the 
55  Drexler, M., Influencing Complex Systems – a Systemic Overview, Young Global Leaders: 
Guide to Influencing Complex Systems (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012).
56  Ibid.
57  Ibid.
58  World Economic Forum (2012). 
59  World Economic Forum, et al. (2013).
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interconnected risks, and help them to envision how they might contribute 
to possible solutions. In 2013, three such cases were presented: “Testing 
Economic and Environmental Resilience” on climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, “Digital Wildfires in a Hyper-connected World” on virally 
distributed misinformation, and “The Dangers of Hubris on Human Health” 
on the existential threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria.60
Dirk Helbing connects complexity with the WEF’s concept of “hyper-
connected” global risks that can set off cascading and concatenating risks 
in his 2013 essay, “Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond.”61 He 
argues that systemic instability is the outcome of globalization processes, 
increasing network densities, sparse use of resources, greater complexity, 
and ever-faster decision-making processes, all of which interact to create 
“hyper-risks.” To increase resilience, Helbing suggests some general 
design principles for global systems. These include: fostering of diversity to 
ensure that at least one backup system exists in case of failure; imposition 
of limits on system scale to reduce the maximum damage from coupled 
failure; introduction of weak links within and between systems to reduce 
system density and, thereby, the rate of transmitted failure or “contagion”; 
deceleration of system processes to enable decision-makers to avoid 
and manage crises; devolution of sufficient authority to lower levels in 
command hierarchies, ensuring the top is not overwhelmed and cross-level 
decisions are not de-synchronized; and the design of certain critical systems 
to operate either partly or completely independently of other systems.62
Global Asia
There is, as yet, no consensus in East Asia as to which problems are 
paramount, let alone which shared solutions should be adopted in the 
search for ways to engage in solving linked global problems at the same 
time. Indeed, it is not surprising that there are no ready-made catalogues 
of the most pressing problems in the region. In many respects, East Asia is 
more of an anti-region than a community, with only nascent convergence 
towards common norms, standards, and practices, let alone institutions of 
consultation, coordination, and collaboration. 
60  Ibid., p. 15.
61  Helbing, D., “Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond,” Nature, 497 (2013), doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature12047
62  Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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To recap, we have shown that some but not all problems are truly global 
in their impact. Those that are fall into one of three basic categories — they 
relate to a global commons, to our shared values as human beings, or to the 
need for regulating human behavior to create global public goods. But we 
have also seen that the “pool” of candidate global problems that meet these 
criteria is very large — upwards of hundreds of such problems compete for 
attention — and that many of these problems are nested within or linked to 
other problems, creating mega-problems. 
Finally, we have noted that leaders from the region of concern to this 
book — East Asia — are yet to present clear statements of what they 
consider to be global problems. They have also yet to identify what global 
problems manifest in, or originating from, this region might be the subject 
of multilateral cooperation in the search for solutions at a regional or global 
level. 
Thus, “Global Asia,” or the relationship between globalization and 
global issues and Asia, still needs to be defined.63 The potential for this 
region to solve problems at a local, regional, and global level is immense 
and urgently required. As Thomas Risse-Kappen argues, the impact of 
transnational actors and coalitions on state policy is inversely related to the 
degree to which specific issue areas are regulated by international society 
or institutionalized, state-based relationships on the one hand, and by the 
capacity of these actors and coalitions to overcome the barriers set up by 
domestic political structures, on the other.64 Nowhere is this clearer than 
in East Asia. One might also infer that the bigger the gap in institutional 
structure, the bigger the need and greater the role of networks of civil 
society. In this region, the security gap is bigger than the economic gap, 
and the cultural gap is greatest of all.
Before moving onto the task of specifying more precisely what is meant 
by complexity when discussing interrelated global problems and solution 
strategies in East Asia, and addressing the potential for civil society to 
contribute to the networked governance of these problems, we must first 
look more closely at the concept of “problem.”
63  “Global Asia” is the name of an important journal published in South Korea that tackles 
exactly this issue. The author is on the editorial board. See Global Asia (Seoul: East Asia 
Foundation), http://www.globalasia.org/
64  Risse-Kappen, T., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Negotiating Definitions of Common Problems and 
Shared Solutions
Earlier in this chapter, we outlined different approaches to ascertaining 
which problems are truly global and how these problems might be framed. 
Now we ask: what is a problem in the first place? At the most fundamental 
level, we may say that humans are goal-directed animals, and goals embody 
values. When a goal is not achieved, values are frustrated and a problem 
is born. 
A problem, therefore, is an obstacle to the realization of one or more 
human goals, either individual or collective. By implication, once this 
obstacle is removed, the goal may be fulfilled and the value defining the 
goal may be realized — provided that no other limiting conditions or 
obstacles are in effect. Thus, a problem measures the deficit between actual 
or perceived reality and what humans desire to be the case. The deficit can 
be viewed pragmatically or with respect to some ideal state. The former 
measure is generally less demanding and is often the basis of pragmatic 
politics in search of marginal improvements to the status quo. The latter 
measure is often the motivating worldview of utopians who push radical, 
dramatic change that ruptures the continuity of past and present. Which 
one is more realistic or idealistic depends on context; whether a social agent 
adheres to incremental rather than radical change depends more often than 
not on the degree to which that agent — a person or an organization — is 
heavily vested in the status quo. 
The core values of societies are only partly overlapping. They vary by 
culture, language, and history. Extensive cross-cultural communication, 
translation, and negotiation are required to establish the common core 
of values that may be threatened and which therefore constitute the 
basis for common problems across cultures and borders. Even when this 
has been achieved, the same “problem” may have different meanings in 
different social locations due to divergent cultural values, social rank, and 
socialization. In some contexts, one person’s problem may even be another 
person’s solution (exploitative workplaces, for example, render some 
people desperately poor and others fabulously rich). In another context, 
the leaders of one country (say North Korea) may find salvation in nuclear 
weapons whereas the leaders of another (say America) may view the 
same capacity to be a dire threat. And the leaders of yet another country 
(say South Korea) may view it as less of a threat and more of an irritant 
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— possibly even an achievement to be admired because as Koreans they 
share more values with North Koreans (for instance, the distrust of great 
powers) than Americans.
This analysis implies that only part of the total set of views as to 
what constitutes a big problem is held in common. This core of shared 
perceptions may be called common knowledge,65 implying that each 
observer of the problem is convinced that another (especially an adversary) 
would agree that it is a problem. It does not, however, signify a consensus 
as to what constitutes the problem itself — a dimension of problems that 
constantly ambushes attempts to solve them. We hypothesize here that 
the problem “tails” — the aspects of the problem that are not captured 
in the overlapping, common view, which we call the core of the common 
problem, but are only perceived separately from distinct cultural angles of 
interpretation — constantly disturb and undermine the effort of one party 
to focus on the core. 
Thus, we should not be surprised to find that even the definition of 
problems that afflict more than one society can be highly contentious. For 
example, China is the source of the bulk of the acid rain in East Asia, some 
of which is deposited in both Koreas and Japan as the winds blow it from 
west to east. On the surface, this might seem like a straightforward scientific 
issue. But in reality, China has been hesitant to concur with trans-boundary 
scientific research that suggests that it is the source of much of the acid rain 
in these countries. In fact, the primary concern of Chinese decision-makers 
is not the impact of the acid rain in Korea or Japan; it is the ghastly impact 
of acid rain on local communities and ecosystems in the immediate vicinity 
of the offending sources of sulfurous emissions. Roughly the same logic 
operates with respect to the yellow sand storm problem.66
Given their true complexity, the only way to generate a common 
understanding across political cultures of interrelated global problems is to 
systematically decompose these problems into their constituent elements 
first at a global level, and then within each country to see where, if at all, the 
overlap is to be found. Inevitably, this exploration entails long and intensive 
dialogue and often uncovers deep assumptions and misconceptions about 
65  Geanakoplos, J., “Common Knowledge,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4) (1992); 
Vanderschraaf, P. and Sillari, G., Common Knowledge (Stanford: Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-knowledge/
66  Streets, D., Energy and Acid Rain Projections for Northeast Asia, NAPSNet Policy Forum 
(Berkeley: Nautilus Institute, 1997); Jho, W. and Lee, H. (2009), p. 62.
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what parties in different countries believe to be problematic or even to 
constitute the factual situation. 
For example, it took two years of meetings, mutual learning, joint 
exploration of issues and concepts, and finally, an extensive process of 
joint writing and word-by-word editing, translation, retranslation, and 
revision, for Nautilus experts from the United States and their Japanese 
counterparts to arrive at a shared, meaningful concept of energy security. 
The final statement of this concept, included in a long report, reads:
A nation state is energy secure to the degree that fuel and energy services 
are available to ensure: (a) survival of the nation (b) protection of national 
welfare, and (c) minimization of risks associated with supply and use of fuel 
and energy services. The six dimensions of energy security include energy 
supply, economic, technological, environmental, social and cultural, and 
military/security dimensions. Energy policies must address the domestic 
and international (regional and global) implications of each of these 
dimensions.67
This concept explicitly included cultural dimensions normally ignored in 
Western thought. Conversely, the American side identified a key attribute 
of energy security not previously analyzed in Japan, namely technological 
diversity over time68— an issue that caused Japan’s power sector to shut 
down reactors starting in 2000 and again in 2002 and that was highlighted 
by the catastrophic Fukushima reactor failures in 2012. Notably, the 
resulting concept was neither American nor Japanese, but rather a hybrid 
concept that truly was more than the sum of the parts. Consequently, its 
application in either culture required extensive explanation and further 
work by its authors, although this has proved productive in a number of 
applied policy contexts, including identifying the most resilient and rapid 
energy security response to the Fukushima disaster.69
In two workshops held in Seoul in 2009 and 2010, researchers from South 
Korea, Japan, and China investigated energy-related and climate-related 
67  von Hippel, D., et al., “Evaluating the Energy Security Impacts of Energy Policies,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, ed. by Sovacool, B. K. (Abingdon: Taylor & 
Francis, 2010).
68  Drawing on a diversity concept based on the Herfindahl index and advanced by Neff, 
T.L., Improving Energy Security in Pacific Asia: Diversification and Risk Reduction for Fossil 
and Nuclear Fuels, Pacific Asia Regional Energy Security (PARES) Project (Berkeley: 
Nautilus Institute, 1997).
69  von Hippel, D. and Takase, K., The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-Term Impacts 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity 
Systems, NAPSNet Special Report (Berkeley: Nautilus Institute, 2011). 
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urban insecurity to explore how these three linked global problems were 
manifest in East Asia. As outlined below, they discovered they had very 
different views as to the nature of the problem and the required solutions 
both within and across countries. 
South Korea: Climate and Energy Linkages with 
Urban Insecurity
Seung Jick Yoo advanced a traditional view of energy security and its 
linkage to climate change in South Korea. He argued the primary source 
of energy insecurity in South Korea is oil import dependency, a reliance 
that can be directly reduced by increasing energy end-use efficiency and 
the supply of renewable energy, which in turn mitigates greenhouse gas 
reductions. The other element of official strategy is to diversify geographic 
supply, in particular from the Russian Far East, via a regional cooperation 
framework advanced by the South Korean government since 2001, albeit 
without much success. He argued that solving the problems of import 
dependency and climate change simultaneously is very difficult and best 
achieved by regional cooperation. At the heart of these solutions is the joint 
development and deployment of new technologies, especially to reduce 
Chinese emissions from dirty coal.70 This approach became the core of the 
South Korean government’s “green growth” strategy. 
In contrast, Sun-Jin Yun analyzed the linkage in South Korea between 
energy scarcity, prices, environmental stress, and equity in terms of energy 
access both across households with varying incomes and between regions 
in South Korea (for example, the concentration of reactors and related 
hazards on the southern and eastern coast to primarily power Seoul).71 
She noted that South Korea essentially functions as an island because the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) blocks the land bridge with 
respect to power and gas supplies from China and Russia. 
She argued that technological change and regional diversification of fuel 
will not suffice to realize energy and climate security in urban areas. She 
70  Yoo, S.J., “Issues in Climate Change and Energy Security in Northeast Asia,” in 
Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia: Climate Change Adaptation and its 
Complexity in Perspective of Civil Society Initiative (Paju: Nautilus Institute, 2008). 
71  Yun, S.J., “Energy Security of Cities in Korea,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in 
East Asia, Green Economy, Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 
2010). 
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held that the standard energy paradigm leads to excessive energy use and 
overconsumption of resources, while concentrating the direct (pollution) 
and indirect (economic- and climate-related) impacts on the poorest and 
most vulnerable populations. The outcomes are energy poverty and 
needless suffering. The key to increasing energy equity and sustainability at 
the same time is not to maintain this paradigm but to provide decentralized, 
distributed, and renewable energy. 
Lee Sang Gun approached the issue of linkage from a spatial perspective. 
He described the political-economic basis that allows ecological services 
and climate impacts to be distributed unequally across regions and income 
levels of South Korean society. The net result is the “apartment dominant” 
urban landscape of South Korean human settlements. 72 This polarization 
leads to a vicious circle described by Lee as “Roads and roofs of building -> 
impervious cover -> hydrological circulation interruption -> vulnerability 
increase (serious damage from heavy rainfall) at Seoul in 2010.” We expand 
on this thesis in chapter 4. 
Myungrae Cho explained that while green growth policies aim to 
ameliorate the negative impacts of climate and energy insecurity on urban 
populations in South Korea, a focus on technological solutions results 
in a paradoxical outcome. The benefits of green growth policies accrue 
mostly to the rich while the effects of environmental degradation fall 
disproportionately on the poor as was evident during the massive floods 
in Seoul in September 2010. A condition of “environmental injustice” is 
thereby created.73 
In this view, green growth is blind to the distributional outcomes of 
policies dedicated to the development and deployment of new technology. 
As Sun-Jin Yun argued, the urban poor in South Korea are most vulnerable to 
the effects of simultaneous resource depletion (higher prices) and increased 
energy consumption (leaving them relatively inefficient and under-served), 
as well as to many of the negative environmental externalities arising from 
energy supply and use. They are disproportionately susceptible to the local 
climate change impacts arising from increased greenhouse gas emissions.
Yun suggested that interdependent changes in lifestyle, land-use, 
energy democracy, and community participation are central to breaking 
this vicious cycle. She argued that these factors are directly linked and 
72  Lee, S., “Climate Change and Green Cities in South Korea,” in Interconnections of Global 
Problems in East Asia, Green Economy, Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus 
Institute, 2010). 
73  Cho, M., “Is the Green Economy Secure in Korea? Dissecting Korea’s Green Growth 
Strategy,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, Green Economy, Urban 
Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010). 
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mutually reinforcing, and entail reshaping not just technology, but entire 
legal and institutional structures.74 In her view, the official solution to the 
linked problems of energy and urban insecurity in South Korea, that is, green 
growth, boiled down to a stimulus, driven by the global financial crisis, that 
funded well-connected “construction and engineering” sectors to build 
nuclear reactors and huge water storage and flood control projects. These 
were primarily constructed to create jobs and to align voters with the ruling 
party. She noted the sharp turn away from an authentic solution in all aspects 
of the current Republic of Korea (ROK) government’s policies for green 
growth, implying that a political change at the top was a necessary enabling 
condition for the full realization of the local potential for sustainability. 
According to these authors, policies intended to address the linkage 
between climate, energy, and urban insecurity have been captured by 
vested interests. Put slightly differently, the “meta-problem” (the WEF 
would call it the critical connecting problem) that connects these clustered 
problems is a failure of national and regional governance. This problem in 
turn represents a binding constraint on what can be done to resolve each 
aspect of the problems of climate- and energy-related urban insecurity. 
China: Multi-level Critical Connections between 
Energy and Urban Insecurity
China presents a very different story to South Korea. According to Wen Bo, 
the mechanisms of social and political feedback from environmental and 
victims organizations to the central government, expressing the desire to 
curb environmental excesses created by local governments and companies, 
have already reached their limit. The scale of pollution and adverse impacts 
arising from local development projects and resource extraction threatens 
to overwhelm the capacity of local governments and political authorities to 
manage the consequent social displacement and political disruption. Wen 
observed that the environmental ministry lacks human and regulatory 
capacity, is particularly weak in local offices, and faces inconsistent legal 
frameworks, contradictory policies, and overlapping institutions. In this 
case, the problem is not so much the appropriation of institutional capacity 
by vested interests in green growth garb, as in South Korea. Rather, the lack 
of institutional capacity generates the social stress evident in Chinese urban 
development.75
74  Yun, S.J. (2010). 
75  Bo, W., “Urban Security in China,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, 
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Conversely, top-down, central planning and allocation of production 
targets and resources have had limited efficacy in reducing energy 
intensity or improving environmental performance, two key indicators of 
sustainability. Yi Wang noted that the green stimulus and recovery package 
China adopted to counter the global financial crisis had alleviated much 
poverty. But it also led to the restoration of polluting, resource-intensive 
traditional industries on the one hand, and by increasing demand, drove 
an absolute increase in energy use and emissions due to the rebound effect 
on the other — even though it reduced energy intensity in various sectors.76 
Ironically, China makes more photovoltaics than any other country, but 
exports 90 percent of them because they are too costly for local use.
Wang argued that two elements are critical to achieving a successful 
sustainability transition whereby energy and climate-driven insecurity 
in China could be tackled at the same time as rapid urbanization and 
development. The first is extensive administrative, managerial, and 
technical-scientific capacity building at the local and provincial levels of 
government to manage environmental issues before they become massive 
and disruptive. The second is a market framework that sends the right, 
long-term price signals to investors, the consuming public, and to private 
corporate management. Due to the failure of the climate negotiations, a 
global market framework that sends such consistent signals and creates 
certainty in the market is missing. Without an informed and highly capable 
set of local actors, including government and community organizations 
of many types, no bottom-up participatory or democratic approach is 
feasible — as was evident in the controversies in Nanjing and Guangzhou 
over the incineration of waste. For civil society, the most important thing 
is local capacity building, including scientific, administrative, managerial, 
and financial capacities to enable civil society to challenge the state. A 
related problem is the market failure created by contradictory property 
rights regimes in the transition from “rural village”-based land ownership 
to “urban” collective land ownership. This inconsistency puts local 
government officials seeking to increase tax revenues and party cadres 
under pressure to evict local residents standing in the way of development 
projects, often leading to corrupt land deals followed by protests and social 
unrest.77
Green Economy, Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010). 
76  Wang, Y., “China’s Approach to Green Development and Transformation of Economic 
Development Pattern,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, Green Economy, 
Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010). 
77  Shin, H.B., “Development and Dissent in China’s ‘Urban Age,’” openSecurity, 25 
 Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia 45
At the level of the city, Wang noted that China has many demonstration 
projects and model cities. The latest project is a low carbon city led by the 
department of climate change. “We have invested a lot of money into these 
programs but have not coordinated between cities. We have a top-down 
approach and we do not have different regional policies. Many regions 
would like to set their own policies and plans, but they do not know how 
to realize their plans. There are a lot of conflicts between the various types 
of plans: low carbon, urban, etc.”78
“In China” he explained, “mayors dominate in urban planning and each 
mayor has their own plans. We change our plans depending on who is 
in office at the time, and they don’t understand how to create a modern 
society. This is a big challenge. We need to integrate the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches in urban development.”79
Thus, in contrast to South Korea, one might say the primary problem in 
China is an outright institutional shortfall based on continued command-
and-control planning, incomplete reform of property rights, and a deficit in 
local government capacity faced with these contradictory pressures. Whether 
this capacity can be built up without political democratization at the national 
level is a key issue. In China, there appear to be multiple, critical connecting 
problems that lead in turn to urban insecurity despite the gains in recent 
years to increase energy end-use efficiency and to supply renewable energy.
Japan: Social and Cultural Drivers of Energy and 
Urban Insecurity
Japan revealed a third picture, different from South Korea and China. In 
contrast to South Korea where institutional interests captured the “green 
solution space,” and to China, where the primary problem is a lack of 
institutional capacity, the Japanese problem derives from rigid paradigms 
of growth combined with institutional gridlock. As Takayuki Minato 
explained, in Japan the process of innovation is driven by the feedback 
loop between individual consumers and producers as expressed in the 
February 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/hyun-bang-shin/
development-and-dissent-in-chinas-urban-age; O’Donnell, M.A., “Laying Siege 
to the Villages: Lessons from Shenzhen,” openSecurity, 28 March 2013, https://
www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mary-ann-o%E2%80%99donnell/
laying-siege-to-villages-lessons-from-shenzhen
78  Wang, Y. (2010). 
79  Ibid. 
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highly regulated market system in Japan.80 Thus, social factors that drive 
consumer behavior at the individual and household level in Japan, such 
as demographic aging, life style changes, and immigration levels, etc., are 
critical to system-level outcomes.
External factors such as Chinese competition for material resources 
and increasingly direct competition with South Korea for export markets 
necessitate government-driven technological innovation to reduce reliance 
on external resources. However, these state-led initiatives are often 
contradictory, slow, hazardous, and costly relative to the agile, rapid, 
and market-based technologies that are created to fulfill immediate social 
demands for goods and services and which have historically been Japan’s 
competitive edge in global trade. Moreover, Japan’s ability to implement 
high technology strategies that rely on imported materials such as rare 
earth minerals is potentially vulnerable to the loss of external suppliers 
(especially from China), which Minato noted is a “cross-national linkage” 
between energy, climate, and urban insecurity in Japan. Consequently, 
Japan and South Korea (which faces a similar constraint) may both need to 
develop new technologies that are not reliant on such minerals.
With regard to energy-driven urban insecurity, Kae Takase described 
the continuing difficulties faced by government and industry in making 
nuclear spent fuel reprocessing a viable energy strategy in Japan. She 
contrasted this with the adoption of a feed-in-tariff that could stimulate 
rapid growth in photovoltaic cell-distributed electricity production and 
achieve Japan’s goals of reduced greenhouse gas emissions if combined 
with a “minimum” nuclear power pathway in Japan.81 She suggested a shift 
from conventional to “comprehensive” energy security policy that would 
capture the full complexity of the energy security issue in Japan, and by 
implication, in other countries. 
In Japan, where the basic minimum needs of most people are already met, 
a key driver of policy is how people think: that is, the basic paradigms that 
drive behavior at all levels. Tetsunari  Iida suggested that in the energy field, 
the basic shift is transforming renewable energy from a fractional wedge on 
the “carbon flatland” to 100 percent (when combined with stringent end 
use efficiency) of the energy supply in a “renewable revolution.”82
80  Takayuki, M., “Urban Security,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, Green 
Economy, Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010).
81  Takase, K., “Energy Security in Japan,” in Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, 
Green Economy, Urban Security And Energy Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010). 
82  Iida, T., “Changing Climate Change & Energy Policy and Politics in Japan,” in 
Interconnections of Global Problems in East Asia, Green Economy, Urban Security And Energy 
Security (Seoul: Nautilus Institute, 2010).
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In his proposed “breakthrough” strategy, Iida relied primarily on local 
initiatives and market response to demand to drive change at the political 
and policy levels, but remained open not only to networking globally 
while acting locally, but also to cross-country, long-distance, and high-tech 
imports of renewable energy. Although the equity issues involved in one 
such project have yet to be analyzed, he referred to the “Gobitec” concept 
whereby solar, thermal, and other renewable sources of power generation 
could be undertaken in Mongolia and exported via long-distance, high-
voltage, and direct-current transmission lines that would traverse China 
and/or Russia en route to the DPRK, ROK, and Japan.83 This vision would 
stimulate development and local employment, create value where little 
currently exists in the Gobi desert, and build economic and energy 
interdependence between the countries of the region. 
As with other regional energy networks that would traverse the DPRK 
(such as electric tie lines connecting the ROK and Russian Far East grids, or 
natural gas pipelines from Russia to the ROK), the Gobitec concept requires 
the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and the opening of the DPRK to be 
plausible. As a multi-billion-dollar, high-tech solution-strategy that would 
likely be championed by states and corporations, this top-down concept 
is the antithesis of the community-level strategies described by Sanghun 
Lee such as the bottom-up “green apartment” movement in Gwangju, 
South Korea, which aims to change community attitudes and consumption 
patterns in fundamental ways. 
Many of the ideological and institutional barriers to implementing the 
strategies described by Takase and Iida were shattered by the March 2011 
tsunami and the ensuing Fukushima catastrophe. The resulting networked 
strategies to realize post-Fukushima reconstruction and develop greater 
resilience are described in chapter 3. What is evident in Japan is that in a 
fully market-driven society, the linkages between climate, energy, and urban 
insecurity arise more from the devolved actions of very large numbers of 
individual, household, and corporate players and less from the policies and 
interventions of state-based agencies (as in South Korea or China). Ideational 
influences are important in all three countries, but are particularly potent in 
Japan, and in different ways than in China or South Korea, in part due to the 
different roles and institutional locations of scholars, mass media, and civil 
society organizations relative to state agencies and policy formation in each 
country.
83  The Gobitec Initiative led by the Hanns Seidel Foundation is described at: http://www.
gobitec.org/ 
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It is evident from the preceding section that it is not simple to determine 
the linkages between global problems such as energy, climate, or urban 
insecurity in East Asia, or even to create a common understanding of what 
constitutes these problems, let alone their linkages. A first step in each 
country to resolving shared global problems requires that the problem be 
decomposed into its separate drivers and constituent parts, with a focus on 
those elements that originate in or affect the East Asian region. 
Separately, national researchers need to undertake substantial empirical 
research into the nature of the problem and solution in each country. Then 
they can attempt a joint mapping of the “complexity terrain” to see if a 
common core exists in the divergent views of these constituent elements 
of the problem and its solutions, and if this common core in turn provides 
a nexus that bridges the causes or the solutions between these problems 
across cultures. This distillation is necessary before a realistic appraisal of 
the potential for concerted action can even begin. 
Before we commence this task (to which the bulk of this book is devoted), 
we must first drill deeper into the concept of complexity to ascertain whether 
civil society organizations and networks are able to provide unique insight 
into these linked problems. And, if so, we must ask what they are capable 
of doing to facilitate collaborative action to address these problems, within 
and across countries of the region. 
Defining Complexity
When we say something is complex, we refer intuitively to the quality 
of a system’s interconnectedness, the relation between parts that makes 
it so complicated or intricate that it is difficult to comprehend. Although 
there is no authoritative definition, a “complex system” has acquired a 
conventional modern meaning in English as one in which:
a.  The interdependent elements of a system interact in a non-linear way 
(meaning that quantitative and qualitative change can occur very 
rapidly); 
b.  The elements themselves are diverse rather than similar in nature; 
c.   The system is self-organizing, and the constituent agents are 
autonomous and can make decisions on their own behalf rather than 
being controlled — that is, they have “agency;”
d.   The structures that emerge at different spatial, physical, and temporal 
scales within the system as a result of interacting, heterogeneous agents 
are unpredictable, but they are also very sensitive to small changes in the 
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initial conditions, changes that are amplified by the non-linear nature 
of interaction between constituent elements of the system resulting in 
chaotic outcomes over time, often called the “butterfly effect;” and
e.   The impacts of small changes at one scale of the system may affect 
another scale rapidly, unpredictably, and structurally — a moment 
sometimes called a tipping point.84
These characteristics contrast with those observed in “simple systems” (see 
Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Characteristics of Simple and Complex Systems
Simple Systems Complex Systems
Few agents Many agents
Few interactions Many interactions
Controlled decision-making Decentralized decision-making
Decomposable Irreducible
Closed system Open system
Static Dynamic
Tend to equilibrium Dissipative
Few feedback loops Many feedback loops
Predictable outcomes Surprising outcomes
Examples Examples
Pendulum Immune systems
Bicycle Genes
Engine Molecules in air
Boyle’s Law Ecosystems
Gravitational system Markets
Source: N.E. Harrison, “Thinking About the World We Make,” in Complexity in World Politics: 
Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, ed. by Harrison, N.E. (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006), p. 3.
In ecological and human systems, such system-level transformations may 
be irreversible, and a system may become “stably unstable” and oscillate 
84  See Baranger, M., Chaos, Complexity, and Entropy. A Physics Talk for Non-Physicists 
(Cambridge: New England Complex Systems Institute, 2001). 
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around a point of equilibrium for a long time due to multiple negative 
feedbacks that discourage change. Sometimes, an apparently random small 
event perturbs the system so much, due to multiple positive feedback loops, 
that it transforms the system itself. Studies of complex systems have been 
undertaken in many disciplines including climate science, mathematics, 
ecology, biology, and even in fields as far from the natural sciences as the 
study of organizational behavior, markets, archaeology, interstate relations, 
land use management, diplomatic negotiations, and security dynamics.85
Today, there are two basic methods for approaching complexity. One 
method made popular during and after the Cold War is to use models that 
attempt to simulate the whole system by defining state variables and the 
algorithms whereby these variables affect each other via defined pathways. 
A good example of this approach was the famous Limits to Growth report 
of the Club of Rome. These deterministic models often led to policy 
decisions that generated highly undesirable outcomes and a false sense of 
understanding and control.86
A second approach, which emerged in the 1980s, is to model each agent 
that exists in a system rather than the system itself. One then uses computer 
models to allow the agents to interact based on rules of environmental 
perception, recognition, decision-making, and learning over time.87 Based 
on multiple — sometimes thousands — of model runs, recognizable 
patterns emerge from the interactions of large numbers of agents. These 
outcomes can provide insight into the determining variables, the sensitivity 
of outcomes to initial conditions, and the counter-intuitive outcomes that 
can occur in aggregate outcomes. Agent-based models are attractive in that 
they highlight how the heterogeneity of the agents affects their interaction 
with each other and their environment. Moreover, there is no presumption 
as to the system-level outcomes. These just happen, deriving from the 
defining characteristics of the agent. Intuitively and appropriately, human 
behavior is treated as a complex system, especially if it involves some kind 
of spatial or social diffusion process including large numbers of people. 
85  See, for example, Cumming, G.S. and Norberg, J., Complexity Theory for a Sustainable 
Future, Complexity in Ecological Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
86  See, for example, Bracken, P.J., The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1983).
87  Berry, B.J.L., et al., “Adaptive Agents, Intelligence, and Emergent Human Organization: 
Capturing Complexity through Agent-Based Modeling,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of the Sciences,99(Suppl 3) (2002), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.092078899
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The concept of complexity can be applied to any system, natural or 
artificial. As defined above, global problems result from the failure of 
natural and artificial systems to fulfil human goals. Today, the quantity, 
universality, and intensity of many human problems make them global 
and therefore common to all humanity. The increased rate and magnitude 
with which complex, interrelated global problems confront us demands 
a correspondingly increased social differentiation and specialization to 
manage and resolve multiple challenges at the same time. In short, as we 
will see below, complex problems demand complex solutions, and complex 
strategies required by complex solutions entail increasingly complex 
organizations, which often fail in spite of their extra effort.
Complexity in Urban Security and Sustainability
Complexity theory originated partly from efforts to understand ecological 
systems such as interdependent predator-prey dynamics; species and food 
webs; the relationship of diversity, especially biodiversity, to ecosystem 
resilience; and social-ecological interactions and system thresholds in the 
context of adaptive management.88 Since the late 1960s, the understanding 
that humans affect the biosphere has increased dramatically, starting with 
the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 
and leading to scores of multilateral environmental accords, as well as the 
attempt to preserve, conserve, and restore global environmental assets and 
services upon which humanity depends for its very existence. Arguably, 
the rising costs of damages to environmental services, which in turn lead 
to a non-sustainable economy, have derived from increasingly complex 
ecological dynamics in the biosphere.89 
Of these efforts, four “overarching” global environmental agreements 
have played prominent parts in East Asia sustainability agendas, both 
diplomatically and domestically. These are the conventions and protocols 
relating to ozone depletion, climate change, biodiversity, and regional 
88  See Levin, S., “Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems,” Ecosystems, 
1(5) (1998), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100219900037; Holling, C.S., “Resilience and 
Stability of Ecological Systems,” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4(1) (1973), 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.es.04.110173.000245; Walker, B. and Meyeres, 
J., “Thresholds in Ecological and Social-Ecological Systems: A Developing Database,” 
Ecology and Society, 9(3) (2004). 
89  Fisk, D.J. and Kerhervé, J., “Complexity as a Cause of Unsustainability,” Ecological 
Complexity, 3(4) (2006), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecocom.2007.02.007
52 Complexity, Security, And Civil Society In East Asia
oceans management. At regional and sub-regional levels, multilateral, 
government-funded dialogues and bilateral activities on acid rain, yellow 
sand, marine pollution, persistent organic pollutants, and biodiversity 
have also occurred.90 By the first decade of the 21st century, environmental 
issues had become sufficiently “hot” in the region to be recognized by 
scholars as security concerns.91
These transboundary and global sustainability problems intersect 
with the emergent pattern of massive urban growth in this region. The 
developing urban corridor also poses an immense challenge for the 
preservation of biodiversity. As we shall see, local governments and civil 
society organizations have begun to tackle the issues arising from this 
rapidly evolving “sustainability complexity” in East Asia. 
BeSeTo: An Emerging Northeast Asian Giga-City?
One of the most important patterns that emerged in the shift from a simple 
to a complex international system in Northeast Asia is the growth of urban 
corridors that now stretch across the region. This conurbation is neither 
planned nor controlled by any city or state. Yet it is the backbone of a tiger 
that cities and states will have to ride into the future. One obvious question 
is what new insecurities will arise from its proximity to the coastal zone, 
given climate change impacts? 
Underlying these networked strategies, countervailing organizations 
and entrenched habits are uncontrolled, incremental expansion of cities 
and rapid connectivity (Internet and cell phones, fast trains, airplanes, etc.). 
This combination creates a set of linked, contiguous mega-cities, sometimes 
called mega-regions: organic entities that are more than the sum of their 
parts. This urban system includes horizontally-linked hinterlands (often 
called “rurbanization,”92 a hybrid rural-urban development also called 
90  For the early period of these regional dialogues, see Hayes, P. and Zarsky, L., 
“Environmental Issues and Regimes in Northeast Asia,” International Environmental 
Affairs, 6(4) (1994). 
91  See Schreurs, M.A. and Hyun, I., The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security : Conflict 
and Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
92  This phrase is used partly to refer to reversal of net migration from rural to urban areas; 
and also widely in India to refer to the combination and infusion of traditional rural 
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“desakota” in poor countries,93 referring to in-situ urbanization in rural 
areas driven by access to and demand from the globalized economy, on 
the one hand, and poverty-driven workforces desperate to generate income 
without moving to the city on the other — a process previously identified in 
Indonesia and now well underway in China)94 and huge vertical, compact 
multi-function poleis that would serve aging populations in wealthy 
portions of the mega-region with super-efficient technology for healthcare, 
mobility, communications, schooling, and entertainment.
The emergence of this connected, contiguous, and interdependent set of 
mega-cities may accelerate if the DPRK opens up to trade and investment 
in the next decade, with huge impacts on energy and climate change risks 
in the region as a whole. Thus, urbanization and its underlying social, 
economic, and technological linkages reconnect in turn to the security and 
nuclear weapons issues posed by the conflict between the DPRK and the 
United States, on the one hand, and by unresolved inter-Korean issues on 
the other. The latter issues constitute a powerful mix of risks that is potent 
enough to register as a global risk in its own right in the WEF framework.
The BeSeTo (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) urban corridor concept came to 
international prominence in a 1996 United Nations University study by 
Sang-Chuel Choe.95 In 1994, it already included 98 million urban dwellers 
living in 112 cities, each populated by 200,000 or more people, across 1,500 
km. Today, this system has grown substantially. By 2050, it could become 
the world’s first giga-city: an agglomeration inhabited by a billion people 
and crossing four countries.
practices with urban amenities and facilities, in a hybrid and transformational manner 
in the rural landscape. See Modi, N., “Introduction to Rurban and Rurbanisation,” in 
Panel Discussion on Rurbanisation (Ahmedabad, 2011).
93  “The desakota phenomenon encompasses more than the term “peri-urban.” It refers to 
closely interlinked rural/urban livelihoods, communication, transport and economic 
systems. Desakota systems occupy, and radiate out from a spectrum of conditions that 
have purely urban and purely rural as the two extreme ends. In this emerging system, 
large sections of the population operate a mixed household economy that straddles 
the urban and the rural, as well as the formal and informal sectors.” Moench, M. and 
Gyawali, D., Desakota: Reinterpreting the Urban-Rural Continuum (Ecosystem Services for 
Poverty Alleviation, 2008). 
94  Xie, Y., et al., Simulating Emergent Urban Form: Desakota in China (London: Centre for 
Advanced Spatial Analysis, University College London, 2005). 
95  Choe, S.C., “The Evolving Urban System in North-East Asia,” in Emerging World Cities in 
Pacific Asia, ed. by Yeung, Y. and Lo, F. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1996).
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Although the core concept was already circulating,96 Choe himself began 
to promote it as early as 1991.97 Indeed, in 1995, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo 
signed a memorandum of understanding which set the pace for inter-city 
cooperative relations, including all types of relations at both public and 
private levels. Hieyeon Keum explains that
In 1993, the Mayor of Seoul (Lee Won-Chong) proposed that city governments 
take concrete steps towards inter-city cooperation at a conference in 
Beijing. The mayors of Beijing (Li Qiyan) and Tokyo (Suzuki) agreed to 
the proposal. The expression of interest by the three capital cities’ mayors 
in Beijing was followed up in April 1994 by an international conference 
in Seoul to explore the scope of and approaches to cooperation. In March 
1995, the three mayors met in Seoul to sign the “Memorandum on BeSeTo 
Cooperation.” The Memorandum stated a consensus among the three capital 
city administrations over the necessity of further three-way cooperation as 
well as a working principle of trust and faith in each other. In addition, the 
Memorandum pledged to involve the private and non-political sectors (such 
as cultural, academic, and athletic exchanges) in the cooperative framework 
as well. More specifically, the Second Memorandum identified four sectors 
for cooperation and exchange among the three mega-cities: economy, urban 
management, science and technology, and culture and the environment. The 
framework envisioned a three phase development trajectory of inter-capital-
city cooperation. The first stage (1995-1997) was going to be one of further 
exchange of ideas and agenda setting. Indeed, a series of discussions on 
specific cooperation and exchanges were held. The second phase (1998-2000) 
would involve exchanges of scholars for more discussions; development 
of new tourist routes; formation of joint ventures; and frequent exchanges 
among city officials. However, except for several cultural exchanges and 
administrative meetings, there has not been discussion on specific areas 
and issues for cooperation and exchanges. The third phase (2000-2005) 
was going to be a period of consolidation, leading to an institutionalization 
of the envisioned cooperative scheme. With the help of their respective 
national governments, the three capital cities were supposed to coordinate 
the construction of an information highway to remove the obstacles to 
communication. The highest stage of the BeSeTo cooperative scheme was 
96  See Seoul Development Institute and Seou1 21st Century Research Center, Building 
the BESETO Cooperation System (Seoul Development Institute and Seou1 21st Century 
Research Center, 1995); Han, Y.J., The Necessity and Role of a Cooperative System among 
the Northeast Asian Mega-Cities; the Future of Northeast Asian Mega-Cities (Seoul: Seoul 
Development Institute, 1994); Jung, H.Y., Seoul-toward a Regional Hub City in the Northeast 
Asia (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2005); Choe, S.C., Status and Role of Seoul for 
the 21st Century (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 1994).
97  Keum, H., “Globalization and Inter-City Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” East Asia, 18 
(2) (2000), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12140-000-0029-y
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going to be the establishment of a permanent organization to coordinate and 
facilitate the cooperation in the four areas listed in the Memorandum.98
However, in the same year, the Seoul-led effort to stimulate collaboration 
between Beijing, Seoul, and Metro-Tokyo fell afoul of bureaucratic politics, 
and the new Mayor (elected in 1994) paid more attention to local issues 
with greater political payoff. Moreover, the private sector was not involved 
in these early dialogues.99 Keum blames the lack of coordinated effort by 
the central and municipal governments to orchestrate the necessary private 
involvement to realize this vision.100 
Furthermore, the extent of economic complementarity as opposed 
to competitiveness between the three mega-cities was unclear. Without 
a champion, the BeSeTo concept could not overcome other powerful 
obstacles, namely the deepening power rivalry within the region and 
nuclear proliferation, especially in North Korea.101 Keum concludes, “At 
the present stage, the BeSeTo scheme remains more of a concept than a 
reality. In view of the political-economic complexities at the national and 
regional levels, the most practical step to follow is to build a BeSeTo urban 
information network.”102
However, the probabilities were always stacked against a scheme based 
on the collaborative strategies of three capital cities, given their different 
economic locations in national hierarchies and global networks of trade, 
finance, and investment. Regional urban corridors do not emerge through 
top-down planning. Rather, they emerge from the uneven processes of 
globalization that promote rapid urbanization and de-urbanization, shifts 
in production location due to relative factor endowment and comparative 
advantage, and changes in policy environment at the local and city level. 
Thus, the detailed study of the Shenyang-Yanbian section of the BeSeTo 
corridor, by Michael Wang and Guoping Lih, found that globalization 
had fragmented the corridor, causing shifts from Shenyang to Yanbian 
in competitive conditions, domestic reform of state-owned enterprises, 
and changing economic conditions in relation to international markets.103 
98  Ibid., pp. 109-10.
99  Ibid., p. 99.
100  Ibid., p. 111. 
101  Ibid., p. 112.
102  Ibid., p. 113.
103  Wang, M. and Li, G., “The Shenyang-Dalian Mega-Urban Region in Transition,” 
International Development Planning Review, 30(1) (2008), doi: http://liverpool.metapress.
com/content/l03530t8627u023t/?genre=article&id=doi%3a10.3828%2fidpr.30.1.1
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Overall, the authors concluded that the corridor is now characterized by 
“increasing divergence in the economic growth of the two urban poles of 
this corridor and a breakdown in rural-urban integration in the region.”104 
Much of the previous rural-industrial development had been driven by 
contracts by big urban state-owned enterprises entered into with town- or 
village-level enterprises. As the former shut down, the latter followed suit. 
Nonetheless, some areas around Dalian have shot ahead, and the overall 
result is fragmentation of the corridor in some areas and rapid integration 
in others. A similar story can be told with respect to the Nampo-Pyongyang, 
Incheon-Seoul, and other major urban corridors that collectively constitute 
the network of cities in the BeSeTo space. 
According to Chinese analysts, a major problem with the BeSeTo concept 
is that Liaoning Province and even Beijing itself are in many ways lagging 
far behind the coastal cities stretching south. In their view, a giga-city is far 
more likely to emerge in the area from Beijing to the Tianjin-Binhai zone, 
from Shanghai to Hong Kong and beyond, than merely from Beijing to 
Tokyo.105
Interestingly, Professor Choe still suggests that the BeSeTo concept 
may be emerging as quickly as other regional corridors.106 However, until 
the DPRK stops impeding the regional completion of dynamic networks 
currently blocked by its rejection of an open economy — which include 
road and rail transportation, telecom, pipelines, power grids, and, above all, 
labor mobility — the full potential vigor and likelihood that a completely 
interconnected BeSeTo corridor in China will emerge cannot be determined. 
Meanwhile, it will continue to evolve in stop-start, disconnected, and 
disjointed ways — exactly how most mega-urban corridors develop. 
Moreover, the concept is still in motion at the policy level. In 2006, for 
example, three research institutes conducted a joint three-year review of 
the BeSeTo concept. It was led by Japan’s National Institute for Research 
Advancement (NIRA) — the Korean and Chinese partners were the Korean 
Research Institute for Human Settlements and the National Development 
104  Ibid. 
105  Chen, X. and Liu, C., “The Reluctant Powerful Participant: China on, in, and out of the 
Pan-Yellow Sea Rim,” in 2010 Presidential Committee on Regional Development International 
Conference (Jeju, 2010). 
106  Choe, S.C., “Incheon City-Region in Korea: Gateway to Northeast Asia — Aspiring to 
Be an Innovative and Learning Region,” in 2nd International Conference on the Process of 
Innovation and Learning in Dynamic City-Region (Bangalore: United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, 2005). 
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and Reform Commission/ISPRE — as part of a NIRA project on “Research 
on a Grand Design for Northeast Asia.” The project undertook: 
In concrete terms, (1) detailed examination of the construction of networks of 
individual transportation modes, such as conceptualization of a high-speed 
rail system for Northeast Asia in the near future, an expressway network 
including the Asia Highway, and a daily roundtrip air shuttle system linking 
the three cities and related major cities; (2) examination of the concept of 
inter-modal networks; and (3) sketching an overview of the construction of 
an intergovernmental platform for economic relations in Northeast Asia.107
In March 2007, this group published the joint Proposal for Promotion of the 
Realization of the BeSeTo Corridor Vision — Toward sustained development 
in the Northeast Asia Region.108 Although they recognized the numerous 
impediments to the realization of this vision, including problems of energy, 
transport, logistics, and urban infrastructure, they argued that 
The BeSeTo corridor is a linear representation of urban agglomerations in 
C-J-K [sic]. It contains major centers of talents and innovation, financial and 
industrial capital, and manufacturing and advanced services. The corridor, 
if equipped with less institutional barriers and a smoothly functioning 
transport system, would certainly contribute to building a more or less 
homogenized economic space wherein agglomeration benefits can be spread 
to enterprises and people.109
“Three things,” they suggested, “are essential for building the BeSeTo 
corridor. They are transport corridors, information highways, and inter-
city networks. Without doubt, these three elements are complementary to 
each other and thus constitute building blocks of the BeSeTo corridor.”110 
Specifically, they argued that collaborative steps can be taken to circumvent 
the DPRK obstacle by implementing inter-modal roll-on, roll-off train 
and road freight systems that load onto and off ferries between Incheon 
and Yantai, alongside an improved Busan-Fukuoka train-ferry system.111 
Achieving this efficiency would entail standardizing rail gauges and 
freight sizes, adopting a common headless-chassis for containers, and 
107  Gangzhe, L., Research Trends: Research on a Grand Design for Northeast Asia (Tokyo: 
National Institute for Research Advancement, 2006). 
108  China Institute of Spatial Planning & Regional Economy, et al., Proposal for Promotion 
of the Realization of the BESETO Corridor Vision-- toward Sustained Development in the 
Northeast Asia Region (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 2007). 
109  Ibid., p. 24.
110  Ibid.
111  Ibid., p. 28. 
58 Complexity, Security, And Civil Society In East Asia
harmonizing customs clearance procedures.112 The group also suggested 
creating a “Northeast Asia Sky Corridor,” an inter-city shuttle service that 
would also entail issuing a fast-visa for passengers using this service.113 
Finally, they promoted a variety of inter-city networking and mutual 
learning activities. These would involve not only the three capital cities, 
but would expand the sub-regional inter-city networks on the rims of the 
Yellow Sea and the East Sea/Sea of Japan, such as the Organization for 
the Northeast Asia Economic Development, the Association of Northeast 
Asia Regional Governments, and the Conference of Major Cities in the 
East Sea/Sea of Japan Rim Region.114 Along these lines, they also called for 
“active and positive participation” by the citizen sector. “The traditional 
exchange mode, which is regional government-centered with supports 
by local business groups and academics such as local universities and 
think-tanks, should be improved to the mode with participation of a 
broader civic sector. Getting this participation of the civic sector will widen 
and enhance the foundation of inter-city network.”115 Perhaps the most 
important single recommendation is the establishment of a virtual “BeSeTo 
Knowledge Corridor” whereby collaborative scholarly and policy research 
could be undertaken on both this concept and related issues by Chinese, 
Korean, and Japanese researchers.116 This would ultimately lead to a virtual 
transnational civil society, especially in areas of environmental and tourism 
cooperation.117
Sceptics may see this study as yet another example of Japanese “big 
think,” a product of a construction state in an endless search for taxpayer 
funds to finance massive public infrastructure markets. Indeed, behind the 
study lay NIRA’s previous work on a “Big Loop” vision that called for a 
circular high-speed railway to connect major cities in Northeast Asia plus 
a high-speed railway system to connect the “Big Loop” to the Shinkansen 
bullet train networks. Also in the background was NIRA’s “New Cross” 
vision to connect the existing main north-south transport artery in Northeast 
Asia with the emerging inner Mongolia-Northeast Asia, east-west traffic 
route, linked by sea and air to Japan.118
112  Ibid., p. 29. 
113  Ibid., p. 30. 
114  Ibid., p. 35. 
115  Ibid., p. 36.
116  Ibid., p. 37.
117  Ibid., p. 38.
118  Mori, N., “A Grand Design for Northeast Asia,” in 15th Northeast Asia Economic Forum 
(Khabarovsk, 2006). 
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Nonetheless, nearly two decades of conceptual work, extensive inter-city 
investigation, the uneven but inexorable process of massive urbanization 
and sprawl, in-situ rural industrialization and urbanization, integration 
of transportation systems, and above all, increasing movement of people 
within the region, suggest that, in one form or another, a BeSeTo corridor 
will emerge over the next fifty years. Indeed, some analysts have already 
added Shanghai to “BeSeTo” to make “BESHTOSHA”: the emerging mega-
corridor along the east Chinese coast to the BeSeTo corridor.119 Whatever 
its final form — and remote sensing data already offers evidence of the 
emergence of this corridor120 — when the world’s first giga-city emerges, it 
will present entirely new challenges of urban insecurity that, in turn, will 
require new forms of networked and trans-border urban governance.
Complexity and Port City Climate Adaptation
According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission in Asia 
and the Pacific, the heads of ports from China, Japan, and South Korea have 
discussed the creation of a North-East Asian Transport Corridor. It would 
link East Asian ports with Europe by sea and land transport and enable the 
Northeast Asian countries to expand their international trade, especially 
Northeastern China. Major ports of call on the China-Japan route include 
Shanghai, Tianjin Qingdao, and Dalian in China and Tokyo, Yokohama, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Moji, and Hakata in Japan. In part, these ports hope 
to avoid over-investment in facilities given the emerging level of need and 
competition for business while gaining from expanded regional flows of 
passengers and cargo that would be facilitiated by trans-border technical 
standards on power supplies, rail gauges, and road safety.121
Almost by definition, port cities are greatly at risk from climate change, 
particularly from rising sea levels, increasingly frequent and intense storms 
and related storm surges, and degradation of physical infrastructure, such 
as accelerated carbonation and chloride-induced corrosion of concrete and 
119  Lee, S.J. and Kim, W.B., “Recent Trends of Cross-Border Cooperation and Spatial 
Strategies of the Northeast Asian Countries,” in Presidential Committee on Regional 
Development, 2010 International Conference (Seoul, 2010). 
120  Schneider, A., et al., “A New Map of Global Urban Extent from MODIS Satellite Data,” 
Environmenal Research Letters, 4 (2009), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/4/4/044003
121  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Subregional 
Cooperation for Shipping and Port Development in North-East Asia,” in Development of 
Shipping and Ports in North-East Asia (New York: United Nations, 2005).
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steel, due to increased atmospheric and oceanic carbon dioxide levels.122 
These impacts will affect the operations of the already highly competitive 
port cities of East Asia, many of which have integrated into global shipping 
logistical and supply chains.123 
As a result, smart port cities are already addressing these direct impacts 
on the physical infrastructure of their port facilities, as well as focusing on 
reducing the carbon footprint of existing operations (largely arising from 
container traffic and docking facilities for ships) and substituting low or 
zero emission vehicles and equipment for the existing greenhouse-gas-
emitting stock.124 Los Angeles is one leader in this respect, but there are 
many others, including some East Asian ports, that participate in the C40 
network of cities cooperating to respond to climate change.125 
Port cities contain vulnerable populations, especially those who live 
on the waterfront and who may gain little from the logistical operations 
by major production entities in the cities’ manufacturing, mining, or 
agricultural hinterland. Worse, they may be displaced by port city 
expansion or heavily polluted by co-located industrial plants, especially 
petrochemical and energy generation facilities. Fishing communities also 
find their traditional homeport often dominated by major interests. Their 
coastal fishing operations may be further disrupted by a combination 
of runoff from watershed abuse and mismanagement, overfishing by 
industrial enterprises, and changes in fishing populations due to climate 
impacts on ocean temperature and circulation patterns. 
In addition to these direct threats that undermine the physical and 
social resilience of port cities in the face of climate change, such cities are 
also subject to major geographic shifts of global competitive advantage in 
the production of globally traded and shipped fossil fuels, minerals, food, 
tourist cruise ships, and other bulk and high value goods that prove to be 
122  Nicholls, R.J., et al., Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate 
Extremes, OECD Environment Directorate Working Paper (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development). 
123  Jacobs, W., et al., “Integrating World Cities into Production Networks: The Case 
of Port Cities,” Global Networks, 10(1) (2010), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-
0374.2010.00276.x. and Ducruet, C. and Notteboom, T., “The Worldwide Maritime 
Network of Container Shipping: Spatial Structure and Regional Dynamics,” Global 
Networks, 12(3) (2012), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00355.x
124  Aerts, J., et al., Connecting Delta Cities, Coastal Cities, Flood Risk Management and Adaptation 
to Climate Change (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2009).
125  C40 Large Cities Climate Leadership Group, “The World Ports Climate Declaration 
and Endorsement Ceremony: Declaration,” in C40 World Ports Climate Conference 
(Rotterdam: C40 World Ports, 2008). 
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climate-sensitive. These factors in turn have multiple non-climate change 
drivers that are global, sectorial, and local. As Darryn McEvoy and Jane 
Mullett explain with reference to Australian port cities: “Volatility in 
markets, for example, increasing climate change impacts on agriculture 
both domestically and internationally, will also need to be factored into 
forward planning. Port planning needs to integrate land use, freight 
transport and environmental issues with consideration of multi-level 
governance perspectives at port, local, state and national levels.”126
Thus, climate change amplifies the existing non-climate drivers of port 
city economic competitiveness or decline, and thereby superimposes new 
risks on top of the direct threats noted above. Some agile port cities will gain 
from this climate-driven shift in global production and trading patterns 
by adopting new, climate-friendly industries; they might become import-
export centers for biofuels, as well as renewable energy generation from 
on-site or offshore, or possibly export hubs for captured carbon. Others, 
wedded to carbon-intensive processing, mechanical manufacturing, and 
logistical systems for bulky, carbon-intensive products such as fossil fuels, 
may lose market share whatever their locational advantage.127 
Some major ports and their affiliated global shipping networks have 
already identified this shift, one driven by indirect climate change and 
which may affect port cities much earlier than, for instance, slowly rising 
sea levels.128 Thus, Rotterdam and affiliated global ports have created the 
global Rotterdam New World Alliance, redefining their primary role from 
industrial-era to climate-era port cities and creating integrated systems on 
common standards. The New World Alliance includes APL (Singapore), 
Mitsui OSK Lines (Japan), and Hyundai (South Korea). At a regional level, 
the European Union is developing new standards to promote climate-
resilient best practices via ESPO, the European Sea Ports Organization. 
A first step is to compile a global index of clean shipping operations for 
carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and sulfur compounds emitted by ships on 
the ocean and in port.129 A coalition of European port cities led by Antwerp, 
126  McEvoy, D. and Mullett, J., Enhancing the Resilience of Seaports to a Changing Climate: 
Research Synthesis and Implications for Policy and Practice (Gold Coast: National Climate 
Change Adaptation Research Facility and RMIT University, 2013). 
127  Stenek, V., et al., Climate Risk and Business: Ports (Washington, DC: International Finance 
Corporation, 2011).
128  Rynikiewicz, C., “European Port Cities as Gateways to a Green Economy?,” Network 
Industries Quarterly, 13(4) (2011).
129  Environmental Ship Index ESI (World Ports Climate Initiative), http://esi.wpci.nl/Public/
Home.
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Rotterdam, Le Havre, Bremen, and Hamburg has undertaken to create 
such an index. 
With an eye on the horizon for the coming storm of climate change-
generated shifts in energy use, cities such as Antwerp have begun to 
implement strategies for becoming distribution hubs for already globally-
traded biofuels such as ethanol, biomass pellets, palm oil, and agricultural 
residues. As algal biofuels become economically viable and major 
producers of this new liquid fuel use existing refined oil product storage 
and distribution systems, port cities may turn into “energy ports.” Ports 
may also be well-situated for the direct transport of captured carbon for 
injection under the seabed or to other industrial and sequestration sites — 
a scheme that is already in pilot stage at Rotterdam and foreshadows its 
future as a “carbon hub.”130 
In East Asia, this dynamic is already in play via the global shipping 
networks and the alliances of port city authorities and corporate terminal 
operators. The direct and indirect impacts of climate change on East Asian 
port cities such as Dalian, Nampo, Inchon, and Niigata will shape urban 
mega-regions along the East and Northeast Asian coastlines, with the 
threats and opportunities challenging each port city. Because the climate 
system is all-pervasive, climate change will affect every aspect of human 
life in the region. The adaptive responses will differ, and no-one can predict 
the bottom-up, networked patterns of adaptation that will make some cities 
resilient and leave others more vulnerable to climate-induced decline. 
Fortunately, many of the measures that cities should take to withstand 
the accumulating impacts of climate change are similar to those needed 
to anticipate other catastrophic events such as tsunamis, pandemics, 
earthquakes, and even wars and terrorist attacks. In this regard, not only 
the central state (including the military) and major corporate sectors 
(especially the financial, insurance, and legal industries) need to prepare 
for climate change.131 Local governments, city agencies, and communities 
represented by civil society organizations also need to act autonomously 
and with strategies tailored to local circumstances, not least because many 
130  Rotterdam Climate Initiative, Port of Rotterdam CO2 Hub: Crucial Stepping Stone Towards 
Sustainable Economic Growth (Rotterdam Climate Initiative, 2012). 
131  Prasad, N., et al., Climate Resilient Cities: A Primer on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Disasters, 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009).
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of the large, centralized institutions are likely to either implement old, brittle 
strategies or deliver too little change, too late, and at the wrong location.132 
In this regard, complex networks, especially “live networks” using 
smart sensors and the latest social media communication devices, may 
enable first responders and communities to react in instantaneous swarms 
to catastrophic events far more efficiently than lumbering, slow, centralized 
agencies. In “cognitive cities,” citizens equipped with smart phones 
become the mobile, omnipresent sensor agent for smart systems integrated 
across sectors.133 As Ali Mostashari et al. explain, citizens “become active 
data generators but also active consumers of urban information.” The 
result will be far greater accountability and efficiency in urban governance: 
“The transparency that a cognitive city provides will put the burden of 
performance on the shoulders of urban service providers, but it will also 
result in more efficient and effective resource allocation decisions. This is a 
fundamental cultural shift — thereby making urban governance far more 
transparent.”134
The need to retreat in the face of climate-driven disasters, to adjust 
course mid-way in the midst of crisis response, and to generate a 
distributed, autonomous response puts the onus on networked civil 
society organizations and local governments to prepare for the worst while 
embracing climate change as the key to building multipurpose resilience 
in port cities. 
Networked Inter-City Cooperation
Whatever its ultimate form, the sheer scale and complexity of the emerging 
giga-city in East Asia poses unprecedented challenges for regional security 
and sustainability. It will create new types of energy- and climate-related 
insecurity for urban areas along its corridor(s). It will require a new, cross-
border form of urban governance that far surpasses the challenges of 
precursor “border cities” in this region.135 Here, we address how networks 
132  Matthias, R. and Coelho, D., “Understanding and Managing the Complexity of Urban 
Systems under Climate Change,” Climate Policy, 7(4) (2007), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.10
80/14693062.2007.9685659
133  Mostashari, A., et al., “Cognitive Cities and Intelligent Urban Governance,” Network 
Industries Quarterly, 13(3) (2009).
134  Ibid. 
135  See studies of Russian-China border towns in Billé, F., et al., Frontier Encounters: 
Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian Border (Cambridge: Open 
Book Publishers, 2012).
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of cities propagate best practice in the emerging giga-city. We also explore 
how civil society organizations accelerate the process of inter-urban and 
cross-border learning and innovation on an issue-by-issue approach — and 
how states may facilitate (or block) this process.
How these networked processes will be affected by the emergent 
patterns and logic of the emerging “giga-ntic” urban corridor is as yet 
unexamined.136 That the corridor will superimpose its own properties, 
dynamics, and cellular structure on the component mega-cities, as well 
as on inter-urban cooperation and transnational civil society networks, is 
certain. 
Kiho Yi suggests that inter-city networks in Northeast Asia already 
contribute to a nascent transnational “solution-strategy spiral.” These 
inter-urban networks, often connecting secondary and coastal cities, 
include the Niigata-Vladivostok-Wonsan triangle, the Kita-Kyushu-Pusan-
Jeju triangle, and a Seoul-Dalian-Shanghai triangle. To these we might also 
add the Busan-Fukuoka bilateral network.137 
Yasuo Takao provides a set of documented case studies examining 
transnational inter-city networked cooperation on a range of economic, 
infrastructure, cultural exchange, human rights, and environmental 
projects between Japanese cities and their counterparts in China and the 
Russian Far East.138 For example, the cities of Dalian (China) and Kitakyushu 
(Japan) cooperated closely through 1996-2010 on the creation of a Dalian 
Environmental Model Zone, transferring the requisite pollution control 
technology and management practices.139 Takao explains: 
The greatest potential for information dissemination lies in local 
government’s expertise transfer to overseas counterparts. The Dalian-
Kitakyushu “friendly” relationship that had been officially established in 
1979 built up a high level of information exchange between the two cities. 
136  See Douglass, M., “Toward Participatory Governance of Transborder Intercity Regions 
in Asia,” in Interventions in the Political Geography of Asia’s Transborder Urban Networks: 
Working Paper Series 193, ed. by Miller, M. A. and Bunnell, T. (Singapore: Asia Research 
Institute, National University of Singapore, 2012).
137  Park, S.H., “Post-Cold War Trans-Border Networks in Northeast Asia: The Busan-
Fukuoka Network,” in Interventions in the Political Geography of Asia’s Transborder Urban 
Networks: Working Paper Series 193, ed. by Miller, M. A. and Bunnell, T. (Singapore: Asia 
Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2012).
138  Takao, Y., “Transnational Coalitions in Northeast Asia: Search for a New Pathway 
of Japanese Local Government,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2 
(2003).
139  Ibid., p. 82.
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In the field of environmental issues, as early as 1981, Kitakyushu began to 
transfer the know-how of local planning and management to Dalian. From 
1996 to 2000, Kitakyushu City in collaboration with the KITA conducted 
energy efficiency improvement projects. In 1998 environmental experts, 
engineers and city officials presented to Dalian through the KITA a set of 
18 preventive environmental proposals including pickling/heat treatment 
process improvement in steel works, production conversion of sulfuric acid 
in a chemical plant, and nitration process improvement of chlorobenzene in 
a dye factory. In the same year, the KITA co-organized with the UN Centre 
for Regional Development a training seminar in Dalian to inform outcomes 
of the Model Zone project.140
The cooperation was not merely formal or contractor-based, but involved 
extensive participation by local business and grassroots groups, as well as 
increased public awareness in both cities.141 At both ends, local government 
officials were able to compel their national governments to support the 
project, putting political pressure on the Japanese aid agency to provide 
the requisite resources, eventually amounting to over $300 million of 
investment in the Model Zone.142 Importantly, city officials from Kitakyushu 
were able to deal directly with Chinese central government officials without 
having to pass via Tokyo. This transnational network enabled the project to 
proceed quickly and with state blessing, but unencumbered by the normal 
bureaucracy. As Takao concludes, “In so doing, they [the city level leaders] 
brought together otherwise unconnected domestic actors in a manner that 
produced a transnational interest that had not existed before.”143 
Takao shows how the Niigata Prefecture played a similar role in 
establishing and hosting a regional acid rain training center in the city of 
Niigata:
In 1998 the Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center (ADORC) was 
established in Niigata. The ADORC started its activity as a branch of the 
nonprofit organization Japan Environmental Sanitation Center, which was 
located in Kawasaki. Since 1993, expert meetings on air pollution and acid 
deposition have been held by several East Asian countries, and in 1998 
Niigata was designated as the interim network center for dissemination of 
monitoring data and other information to the participants.144
140  Ibid., p. 85.
141  Ibid., p. 87.
142  Ibid., pp. 98-99.
143  Ibid., p. 104.
144  Ibid., p. 84.
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Having delved into the complex connections linking energy and urban 
insecurity and deriving from the bottom-up nature of urbanization in East 
Asia, we now turn to the relationship between complexity and geopolitical 
security issues in the region. In the course of doing so, we will discuss 
networked solution strategies that have been implemented by civil society 
networks to increase security and sustainability in East Asia. 
Complexity and Security
Orthodox, realpolitik accounts of international security assume the 
unitary nature of the key actors (states), the nature of the game that they 
play (balance of power), the anarchic nature of the international system, 
and the key determinant of outcomes in the competition for power and 
influence (military capacity). In the Cold War period, a relatively simple 
bipolar model of the international system dominated, at least in the West: 
the nuclear balance-of-terror stabilized the system through fear of mutual 
annihilation by the American and Soviet blocs. 
In reality, these are theories that overlap considerably. From a theoretical 
perspective, the concept of security propagated by all of them suggests that 
the state system is closed, determinate, and rests ultimately on the attempt 
to exert top-down control over unruly social and political phenomena. Fear 
is the fundamental basis of security in this realist world, dominated by the 
means of coercion and destruction, and the main way to understand the 
relative power of states or the structure of the region is to examine both 
these means and the elite’s perceptions of threats.145 The primary goal of 
the national security state is to maintain order. At the international level, 
the goal of great powers in a nuclear-armed world is to preserve the status 
quo, often termed “stability.” Thus, one of the main security challenges 
in the region, the North Korean nuclear weapons program, is viewed as a 
threat to the existing balance of power. It threatens not only to rupture the 
regional order, a “punctuated equilibrium” in what was previously viewed 
to be a homeostatic system, but to herald the dawn of a new global nuclear 
era in which nuclear-armed rogue states and non-state actors disturb 
strategic stability.146
145  See, for example, Hassig, K.O., Northeast Asian Strategic Security Environment Study 
(Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001). 
146  Wilson, P., “Does ‘Strategic Stability’ Have a Future in Northeast Asia?” in Strategic 
Stability in a Turbulent World: SAIC Report of 5th Nuclear Stability Roundtable to Defense 
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The constraints on independent behavior within this rigid, bipolar 
system became less effective with the reconstruction and rise of Japan and 
Europe. Consequently, new and less mechanistic theories emerged that 
reflected the shift in the underlying political-economy of American global 
hegemony. Liberal institutionalism proposed that states are able to cooperate 
even in a system without an overarching authority by concentrating on the 
norms, rules, and organizations that regulate and manage international 
affairs.147 A variant, Gramscian hegemonic theory, suggests that less powerful 
states not only defer to great powers, but also consent to their subordination; 
they should therefore share the ideology of common political, economic, 
and security interests that legitimates the leadership of an external great 
power. And finally, state formation theory argues that nuclear weapons are 
one of the ways in which state elites not only project threat against external 
adversaries, but also employ it to reinforce domestic control.148 
Since the mid-nineties, a “complexity paradigm” has begun to challenge 
these traditional theories of the international system. In this view, there is no 
world or regional system of states, but only the macro-outcome aggregate 
results of the systematic interaction of large numbers of constituent agencies 
within and between states. The results of this interaction at any point in time 
are highly unpredictable. A further consequence of this view is that there is 
no homeostatic “balance-of-power” between states; rather, the power flux is 
always dynamic and never the same.149 As James Rosenau explains:
Even the most complex system can maintain long equilibrium before 
undergoing new adaptive transformations, or what complexity theorists call 
“phase transitions.” Put differently, their progression through time can pass 
through periods of stasis or extremely slow, infinitesimal changes before 
lurching into a phase transition, thereby tracing a temporal path referred to 
as “punctuated equilibrium.”150
Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems Concepts Office (McLean: Science Applications 
International Corporation Strategies Group, 2003).
147  Mann, S.R., “Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought,” Parameters (1992). 
148  Tanter, R. and Hayes, P., “Beyond the Nuclear Umbrella: Re-Thinking the Theory and 
Practice of Nuclear Extended Deterrence in East Asia and the Pacific,” Pacific Focus, 26 
(1) (2011), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01053.x
149  Harrison, N.E., “Thinking About the World We Make,” in Complexity in World Politics : 
Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, ed. by Harrison, N. E. (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006).
150  Rosenau, J.N., “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World 
Affairs,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, ed. by Alberts, D. S. and 
Czerwinski, T. J. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002). 
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As a defining case in point for our purposes, the rigid boundaries and spheres 
of American and Soviet Cold War influence fractured, splintered, and flew 
apart in 1991, and then re-aggregated in ways that were inconceivable a mere 
decade before. In the two decades since 1990, new states were founded at the 
net rate of 1.6 per year,151 and international non-governmental organizations 
and transnationally active corporations were created at an astonishing 
rate. Today, there are some 27,000 internationally active non-governmental 
organizations,152 63,000+ multinational corporations,153 and about 3,000 
cities with over 100,000 people, plus another ~19,000 human settlements 
with populations between 5,000 and 100,000. Overall, therefore, there are 
roughly 110,000 leaders with global reach. (Good data are hard to come by, 
but according to C. van Marrewijk et al., there were about 2,957 cities with 
100,000 or more people on Earth in the early 1990s.154 J. Vernon Henderson 
and H.G. Wang estimate that there were 2,684 cities with populations of at 
least 100,000 or more people in 2000.155 Yet another accounting states that 
there are currently about 21,905 urban areas each populated by more than 
5,000 people, of which about 18,948 contain between 5,000 and 100,000 
people).156
The leadership of many of these non-state entities conduct their 
own international activities across state borders. Clearly, a theory that 
concentrates on the dynamics of only 190 interacting states does not 
capture the full complexity of the international system today. One of the 
tenets of complexity theory is that as the number of agents and the degree 
of their freedom in a system increase, so the outcomes become increasingly 
difficult to predict. This happens because the agents in a complex system 
have agency — they must make decisions based on available information, 
151  Net because some states flew apart (Yugoslavia into five states) and others unified 
(Germany, Yemen).
152  For INGOs, see Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International 
Organizations 2012-2013: Geographical Index: A Country Directory of Secretariats and 
Memberships (Boston: Brill, 2012). 
153  For multinational corporations, see Gabel, M. and Bruner, H., Global Inc: An Atlas of the 
Multinational Corporation (New York: New York Press, 2003).
154  C. van Marrewijk, et al., International Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
(data tables at: http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/international/zipf.htm).
155  Henderson, J.V. and Wang, H.G., “Urbanization and City Growth: The Role of 
Institutions,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37(3) (2007), doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2006.11.008
156  Data Sets, Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (New York: SocioEconomic and 
Applications Data Center, Colombia University), http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/
data/collection/grump-v1/sets/browse
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and these decisions are undetermined in advance because of the stochastic 
way that different types of agents interact over time. 
Thus, in the post-Cold War period, when rigid division between 
two essentially closed, relatively simple systems of states collapsed 
into an open flux across borders, new and powerful players entered the 
field of cross-border relations within the East Asian region. Indeed, 
some agents — corporations, unions, civil society organizations such as 
development agencies or religious movements, diasporas, and sometimes 
even individuals — may cross over and act simultaneously in more than 
one open, complex system at a time (a state, a market, and a church, for 
example). Some may cross state borders and operate simultaneously in 
multiple state systems or in international commons under the jurisdiction 
of no state (like pirates on the ocean). Others may be transnational actors 
working at the same time at different levels and locations through networks 
and influential webs such as the virtual diasporas supporting irredentist 
movements,157 thus creating a kind of quantum politics. Neil Harrison 
calls such actors “meta-agents”158 because they are both agents at a lower, 
domestic scale of the larger international complex system and acted upon 
at the same time by other states in the international system, itself a dynamic 
complex system that is not controlled centrally and constitutes an open-
ended, evolving structure.159
By this perspective, a state — a very large emergent system in its 
own right — adapts to other states, or constantly co-evolves with them 
to regenerate the international system of states. In this view, global or 
regional level interstate relations are not stable per se — an attribute that is 
often referred to as a positive value, the maintenance of which, by virtue 
of lending predictability to the outcomes of inter-state transactions, should 
guide the exercise of great power. Rather, the relationships between states 
are continuously reinvented and the “balance” between contending forces 
is always dynamic, a “fleeting embodiment” of the underlying deep 
organization of the domestic and international systems, never returning to 
the same equilibrium point.160
157  The Internet and International Systems: Information Technology and American Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making Workshop (Berkeley: Nautilus Institute, 1999), http://oldsite.nautilus.
org/gps/info-policy/workshop/papers/
158  Harrison, N.E. (2006), p. 8.
159  Ibid., p. 27. 
160  Ibid.
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Complex Adaptive Systems and Networked 
Governance
The agents that constitute a complex state system — that is, individuals, 
civil society organizations, state bureaucracies, etc. — are all purposeful 
and able to learn and adjust their behavior in response to other agents and 
environmental factors. They may be able to change their behavior very 
quickly to adapt to external stress, and thereby lend resilience to the whole 
system — at least for a while. In doing so, they will often innovate and create 
new types of social agents, or differentiate those that exist to specialize in 
particular types of adjustment — as occurred, for example, when nuclear 
weapons were deployed, forcing whole new types of military organization 
and thinking to affect the traditional posture of military forces. Each of 
these kinds of innovation represents an increase in social complexity, or as 
Joseph Trainter puts it:
[Complexity] is a fundamental problem-solving tool. In its early phases, 
complexity can generate positive feedback and increasing returns. Confronted 
with challenges, we often respond by strategies such as developing more 
complex technologies, adding more elements to an institution (specialists, 
bureaucratic levels, controls, etc.), increasing organization or regulation of 
transactions, or gathering and processing more information. Each such action 
represents increasing complexity. Their effectiveness comes in part because 
changes in these dimensions can be enacted rapidly. While humans may be 
complexity-averse when we personally bear the cost, our problem-solving 
institutions can be powerful complexity generators. All that is needed for 
growth of complexity is a problem that requires it. Since problems always 
arise, complexity seems to grow inexorably. Since complexity is an adaptive 
problem-solving strategy that has costs, it can be viewed as an economic 
function. Societies invest in complexity.161
Unsurprisingly, complexity theory has been applied not only to the 
international system as a whole, as outlined above, but also to the realm of 
military security in the aftermath of the Cold War. Just as realist theories 
of the international system were mechanical in nature, so theories of war 
and military strategy in the industrial era were “Newtonian”: that is, they 
posited that war was linear in nature, that its effects could be observed 
and predicted, and that military organization and warfighting itself were 
161  Tainter, J.A., “Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability,” Population and 
Environment, 22(1) (2000), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006632214612
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subject to effective centralized command and control from above. Today, 
war is viewed dynamically. As John Schmitt states: 
War is fundamentally a far-from equilibrium, open, distributed, nonlinear 
dynamical system highly sensitive to initial conditions and characterized 
by entropy production/dissipation and complex, continuous feedback. 
Rather than thinking of war as a structure at equilibrium, we should think 
of it as a standing wave pattern of continuously fluxing matter, energy, and 
information.162 
Like other social domains, Northeast Asia’s militaries have faced a 
general shift from simple to complex environments, from simple to 
complex warfare. Instead of defined battlegrounds with distinct frontiers 
and dedicated forces, the military in each country faces diverse types of 
adversaries. (The exception is the Korean Demilitarized Zone, frozen in the 
1950s on the northern side). Many possible adversaries for each military 
operate without central direction. They do not present fixed targets. Yaneer 
Bar-Yam argues that the military is particularly susceptible to the general 
law that an organization’s repertoire of possible actions must be at least 
as complex as the challenge confronting it. As Bar-Yam argues, “In a high 
complexity environment, high complexity forces are more capable than 
low complexity ones. Thus, an effective analysis of warfighting capability 
must include both scale and complexity of the forces and the environment 
where the conflict occurs.”163 
The scale at which the military applies force becomes a critical 
issue because its practices must match the level of complexity of the 
countervailing military. “A force that is organized, trained and otherwise 
prepared to apply large scale force,” he writes, “is not well suited to high 
complexity conflicts.”
Similarly, a force that is designed for high complexity conflicts is not 
well suited to large scale conflicts. More generally, the complexity of a 
force’s capabilities at each scale of a possible encounter is a key property 
that describes the abilities of that force. This, then, is the central basis for 
162  Schmitt, J.F., “Command and (out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity 
Theory,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, ed. by Alberts, D. S. and 
Czerwinski, T. J. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002); Rosenau, J.N. (2002), 
p. 37.
163  Bar-Yam, Y., Complexity of Military Conflict: Multiscale Complex Systems Analysis of Littoral 
Warfare (Cambridge: New England Complex Systems Institute, 2003).
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evaluating the effectiveness of force design in the face of a specific complex 
military mission or conflict.164
As Trainter noted above, the argument that the complexity of organizations 
and problems must match to find solutions is a general proposition about 
the relationship between problem-solving organizations and the issues they 
tackle. As the number of complex global problems increases, so the level of 
social complexity must increase to solve these problems. This imperative 
creates a need for new forms of organization to fill the “complexity deficit,” 
as we shall see below. 
Perhaps the most intractable and profound security problem in the 
region is the divided Korean Peninsula. The North Korean nuclear threat is 
the only geopolitical global risk originating in East Asia that can be found 
among the WEF’s top fifty global risks — in which the criterion is that a 
risk could impose a cost of more than $10 billion dollars. Therefore, we will 
examine the evolution of the Korean Peninsula from a simple to complex 
security environment. 
Korea’s Complex Regional Security Environment
The security environment of a small nation like Korea is especially 
complex, due in part to its division into North and South Korea, but also 
to the nature of great power relations. Five decades after the end of the 
Korean War, and two decades after the end of the Cold War, Korea remains 
trapped in a set of mutually reinforcing security dilemmas. These are 
partly driven by geopolitical circumstances in which great powers continue 
to exercise influence over the two Koreas. These external powers aim to 
realize their own interests in Korea by exercising diplomatic and military 
power in response to the DPRK’s nuclear breakout, on the one hand, and 
by attempting to pursue their divergent interests with respect to the future 
of the Peninsula regarding territorial disputes, resource management, 
military deployments, and crisis management, etc., on the other.
In this manner, classic geopolitical concerns such as the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, the maintenance of the reputation of United States as 
nuclear and global hegemon, Sino-Japanese hostility, Sino-US distrust and 
the Taiwan Straits issue, and the desire of Russia to participate in regional 
security and development schemes are all super-imposed on and shape the 
164  Ibid., p. 4.
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fundamental insecurity of Korea. This insecurity includes its division by 
war and the long standoff between its two halves. These external drivers 
over-determine inter-Korean relations and make it almost impossible to 
align the internal and external variables that influence progress or regress 
in those relations. When domestic Korean political and economic variables 
are added to the conflict equation, especially the isolated nature of the DPRK 
regime and the volatility of the ROK’s democratic polity, it is almost certain 
that one or more of the critical external variables will be out of alignment 
at the brief moments when the two Koreas are able to accommodate each 
other. This makes periods of inter-Korean rapprochement short and 
virtually ensures their brutal, often abrupt termination and reversion to 
chronic conflict.
Thus, one could compare regional security problems to a classic six-
sided Rubik’s Cube with an additional layer of complexity arising from 
the domestic variables. As is well-known, the solution to the Rubik’s Cube 
requires that each of the six faces — just as there are six states in East Asia 
— show only one color: each of these faces has nine cells, totaling fifty-
four independent externally-oriented variables. The combination of cells 
by permutation is enormous, and solving the Cube takes practice, skill, and 
knowledge of solution algorithms that exceed the ability of most people.
As Changrok Soh has observed, since the Cold War ended, non-
state actors have transformed what was a strict hierarchy of hegemonic 
state control into a “horizontal self-autonomous system” organized into 
networks composed of states and non-state actors. These diverse actors 
interact in transnational networks and contribute a new type of “networked 
governance” to the traditional, state-dominated system. This hybrid 
organizational innovation has been critical, for example, in developing a 
human rights regime in East Asia, and in creating a multilayered strategy 
to promote human security in the region.165 
Such networks have inaugurated a loose web of multilateral dialogues 
and concerted activities in the East Asia region that supplement rather than 
supplant the dominance of existing states.166 Ha Young Sun has described 
this phase of international relations in East Asia as the “wolf spider” 
165  Soh, C., “Enhancing Human Security in North Korea through Development of a Human 
Rights Regime in Asia,” Korea Review of International Studies, 10(1) (2006).
166  Yeo, A., Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and Institutional Change in Northeast Asia’s Regional 
Security Architecture, EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series (Seoul: East Asia 
Institute, 2011). 
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stage, in which great powers still hunt for prey, but also form complex, 
multi-sectoral networks of diplomatic, economic, cultural, and ecological 
interdependence built on a foundation of information and knowledge.167 
Although it is small, South Korea is ahead of the pack in developing 
a networked strategy as a global actor, and may even lead China, still 
preoccupied with consolidating its economic development. North Korea 
lags far behind in this view, and to co-evolve with the other states without 
collapsing, to survive at all, it must introduce networked strategies.168 
Moreover, it must integrate with South Korea at the same time or fall apart. 
Along the way, leaders in each country must become cosmopolitan and 
adopt multiple identities as national and regional citizens.169 Koreans face 
the extra challenge of adopting a triple identity as citizens of a divided 
nation, citizens of separate Korean states, and citizens of the East Asian 
region.170 
Thus, in Ha’s view, South Korea should develop its thickest, stickiest 
webs with the United States and Japan, but over time, he suggests its web of 
relationships with China will be equally important. From this perspective, it 
is particularly important that South Korea do everything possible to ensure 
that China and the United States do not tear apart their web of increasing 
interdependence; South Korea can play the role of network mediator 
(sometimes called a border-spanning role in network theory), using its 
information power and knowledge to weave together the American and 
Chinese webs. 
South Korea should also find ways to work around the “structural 
holes” that exist in the Japanese and American webs with respect to North 
Korea — a state almost bereft of networks in the sense used here.171 South 
Korea, he avers, can use its network power to overcome its relative scarcity 
of resources in terms of size and military power, but not, he implies, if it 
continues to be distracted by petty competition with North Korea rather 
than forging joint strategies.172 In short, as he suggests, “The complex time 
of the twenty-first century calls for complex networks.”173
167  Ha, Y.S., Path to an Advanced North Korea by 2032: Building a Complex Networked State, EAI 
Asia Security Initiative Working Paper (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2011). 
168  Ibid., p. 13.
169  Ibid. 
170  Ibid., p. 14.
171  See Mansourov, A., Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National 
Security on the Korean Peninsula (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005). 
172  Ha, Y.S. (2011).
173  Ibid.
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Ha Young-sun’s concept is controversial in South Korea, not the least 
because the Lee Myung-bak government funded his South Korean-Japan 
project in 2009, to develop a joint concept of Korean-Japanese future 
relationships, as part of Lee’s “Global Korea” strategy.174 In support of this 
strategy, it proposes to maximize the soft power and public diplomacy of 
a middle-sized power by creating networks that promote national goals.175 
Others from the Ha study-group of complex diplomacy have suggested 
that South Korea implement a networked middle-power strategy to cope 
with the pressure placed on it by the US-China power transition in the 
region. Instead of having to choose between the United States and China, 
as Lee Sook-Jong states, South Korea should 
pursue middle power diplomacy on global issues based on its Unites States 
support while staying away from some regional security issues that would 
invite US-China rivalry, such as the Taiwan issues and the South China Sea 
maritime disputes.176 
The September 2011 opening of the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul was the epitome to date of the pursuit of 
this complex networked statecraft at a regional level, while the convening 
of the 2010 Seoul G20 summit exemplified it at a global level.177
Ha and colleagues have not fully embraced the role of civil society in 
their concept of the “complex networked state,” a polity in which civil 
society would not necessarily align with the goals of the nation state, but 
instead develop a cosmopolitan agenda that may counter rather than 
facilitate advances by the state. In part, Ha’s state-focused concept reflects 
the relatively weak civil society sector in China, Japan, the two Koreas, 
and Russia. Nonetheless, civil society is in play in different and powerful 
ways within each society and across borders, even in North Korea. Civil 
society has already demonstrated its capacity to affect state agendas and to 
174  “Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era,” KBS World Radio, 27 January 2009, http://
world.kbs.co.kr/english/archive/program/news_zoom.htm?no=4709&current_page=44 
175  Sohn, Y., “Searching for a New Identity: Public Diplomacy Challenges of South Korea 
as a Middle Power” in Opening New Horizons for Public Diplomacy and Culture in the 21st 
Century, 2012 Korean Association of International Studies-Korea Foundation International 
Conference (Seoul: Korea Foundation, 2012); Sohn, Y., “Middle Powers’ Like South 
Korea Can’t Do without Soft Power and Network Power,” Global Asia, 7(3) (2012).
176  Lee, S.J., South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy, EAI Asia Security 
Initiative Working Paper (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012). 
177  The history of the Secretariat: Politics (Seoul: Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat), http://
www.tcs-asia.org/dnb/board/list.php?board_name=3_1_1_politics
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assert its own priorities in the region in different issue areas. We examine 
complex diplomacy in greater depth in chapter 6. We turn now to the role 
that networked civil society has already played in responding to global 
ecological problems in Northeast Asia, implementing its own foreign 
policies or “civic diplomacy” across national borders. 
Civil Society’s Networked Search for Cooperative 
Solutions
In networked governance strategies, civil society actors have already 
contributed significantly to weaving the kinds of web espoused by Ha. 
They are particularly adept at creating networks that identify where global 
problems intersect, where solutions may jointly address more than one 
problem at a time, and where different linked problems might be tackled 
simultaneously to solve a common problem. In principle, civil society 
networks are also particularly suited for sensitive security tasks such as 
engaging North Korea, having the agility to forge relationships and deliver 
joint benefits quickly, without regard for the old “decision rules” adhered 
to by slow-moving, conservative bureaucracies. 
Here we use networks to refer to structured patterns of communication 
and coordination originating with social actors who are not part of the state. 
As the degree to which the state encompasses social, economic, cultural, and 
even religious life varies in each society, so too does the relative autonomy 
and organizational capacity of civil society organizations originating 
in these spheres. Civil society organizations may reside primarily in the 
market or in the social sphere in all its diversity. The networks they spawn 
may incorporate actors from multiple sectors, including the state, provided 
the impetus is generated and maintained by civil society organizations. 
Their influence arises by virtue of their structural position. This is due 
either to their degree of connectedness, which enables them to increase the 
speed and quality of information flow across networks, thereby making 
the world smaller, or to their ability to fill structural “holes” between other 
networks by spanning borders or boundaries, thereby creating networks of 
networks enabling other organizations to communicate in ways otherwise 
thought impossible. The Nautilus Institute’s NAPSNet information service, 
with readers in every country in the region and, often, contributors from the 
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“community of readers,” is the former case in point.178 “Track 2” dialogues 
such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue are the classic instance of 
the latter.179 
Civil society actors are defined here not just with respect to the degree to 
which they are civilian, but also to the point to which they are committed to 
universally accepted values. John Keane argues that to the extent that civil 
society organizations realize the latter, they are truly part of “global civil 
society.”180 Because many societies contest these values, what one society 
views as civilizing may be viewed negatively in another (gender-based 
rights, for example). Some “dark” non-state networks engage in activities 
that are arguably barbaric, such as human trafficking, drug or arms trading, 
or the propagation of international terrorism. 
Thus, not all non-state networks are civil society networks as defined 
here, and some of these dark networks may contribute to the global problems 
that afflict the region.181 In this book, we have not sought out to illustrate 
this point, or to make a net assessment of the contribution of civil society 
and its diplomacy as described in subsequent chapters. There are plenty of 
failures to point to in which an uncivil society campaigned for socially and 
culturally regressive goals (historical revisionism and Japan’s textbooks are 
described in chapter 6); and there are also many instances in which single-
issue civil society groups caused more chaos by mis-specifying their goals, 
seeking to bring about an ill-conceived or poorly understood solution, or 
failing to implement it in a competent, sensitive manner. In this book, we 
try to understand how civil society and its agencies may succeed, not fail, 
and we recognize that much research remains to be done in relation to 
the activities of uncivil society and its agents, as well as the performance 
metrics and record of civil society in this region. 
178  See Hayes, P., et al., “The Impact of the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Network 
in US-DPRK Conflict Resolution,” in Internet and International Systems: Information 
Technology and American Foreign Policy Decision-making Workshop (Berkeley: Nautilus 
Institute, 1999). 
179  See The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (La Jolla: University of California Institute 
on Global Conflict and Cooperation), https://igcc.ucsd.edu/research-and-programs/
programs/regional-issues/northeast-asia/northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue.html
180  Keane, J., Global Civil Society?, Contemporary Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
181  Such as DPRK drug smuggling across the border to China. See Meng, L., “Study on 
Problem of Trans-Border Drugs Crimes on Sino-DPRK Border,” The Journal of Chinese 
People’s Armed Police Force Academy, 1 (2009). 
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To succeed, the leading agents in a networked complex adaptive system 
must have internal decision rules, the ability to learn from interaction with 
other agents and their environment, and thus the flexibility to adjust their 
decision rules and strategies. Most critical of all, civil society networks 
build enduring relationships that make trust possible, especially in conflict 
zones. Each of these engagements will change attitudes, build relationships, 
and make it possible to conceive of a world in which communication leads 
to cooperation and, in turn, to collaboration between warring parties. 
As Raul Lejano put it (in relation to establishing peace parks in conflict 
zones such as the Korean Demilitarized Zone), the process of creating 
such networks may lead to relationships “between actors, between groups 
of actors, between subsets of each group, etc. That is, we do not simply 
model cooperation as occurring between states, but between individuals, 
organizations, epistemic communities, and others. This follows from the 
fact that relationships are multiplex, unbounded, and dynamic.”182 
By multiplexity, Lejano means the “multiple contexts of a relationship 
whereby roles, exchanges, or affiliations overlap in a social relationship.” 
In addition to their structural attributes, networks are powerful because 
their social agents, especially individuals, live many lives at once, and each 
of these public and private lives intersects with other social networks, often 
not related directly to the primary concern of the issue-based network. 
Yet information will travel over any connected network, not just one that 
is designed around an issue. This is why taxi drivers, hairdressers, and 
other agents whose location leads them to connect with many people at the 
boundaries of their multiple identities are such good sources of rumor or 
hard information. 
A good example of a regional multi-sectoral network is the Northeast 
Asian Forest Forum (NEAFF). Launched by South Korean foresters in 1998 
and initiated by businessperson Moon Kook-Hyun, participants include 
forestry and paper companies, environmental organizations, forester 
associations, scholars, and individuals in China, Mongolia, and South 
Korea. It aims to “restore degraded forest lands, to combat desertification 
and deforestation, and to promote environmentally sound and sustainable 
management of forest ecosystems in the region.”183 NEAFF worked in the 
DPRK to reforest 1.6 million hectares of land deforested for fuel wood and 
182  Lejano, R.P., “Theorizing Peace Parks: Two Models of Collective Action,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 43(5) (2006), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343306066565
183  Keep Northeast Asia Green (Seoul: Northeast Asia Forest Forum), http://www.neaff.org/
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timber by establishing and upgrading forest nurseries. It also planted trees 
and fixed sand dunes in China’s Inner Mongolia and the Gobi Desert of 
Mongolia. 
A closely related civil society initiative was Forests for Peace (FFP), an 
inter-Korean reforestation project that aimed to restore degraded forestland 
and food production in North Korea. Begun in April 1999, FFP worked on 
a bilateral basis with the DPRK Asia Pacific Peace Committee and shipped 
pine tree seeds, spray machines, branching shears, plastic sheeting, and 
fertilizer on 22 May 1999 to the DPRK via the Inchon-Nampo sea route. 
Following that initial shipment, five more consignments containing various 
supplies and forestry equipment were dispatched by the end of 2000.184 
In the 1990s, a network of civil society organizations in Northeast Asia 
actively worked to address regional acid rain and yellow sand issues as 
well as to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 1995, the Atmospheric 
Action Network in East Asia (AANEA) launched with members from 
South Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Russia. 
AANEA’s funding came from Japan and the secretariat was based in 
Seoul.185 It aimed to reduce acid rain emissions, monitor the impact of 
acid rain by promoting citizen air quality measurement techniques, and 
address co-related greenhouse gas emissions.186 However, the group faded 
away after achieving few concrete reductions in emissions. It suspended 
operations not long after 2000.187 Another regional network, EnviroAsia, 
is sustained by a coalition of Japanese environmental groups. The project 
shares information about the environment between groups in South Korea, 
China, and Japan.188
Esook Yoon argues that the failure of state-based environmental 
dialogues and meetings to reduce trans-boundary air pollution in East 
Asia opens a political space that may be filled by non-state civil society 
184  Moon, K.H. and Park, D.K., “The Role and Activities of NGOs in Reforestation in the 
Northeast Asian Region,” Forest Ecology and Management, 201(1) (2004), doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2004.06.013
185  Jho, W. and Lee, H. (2009), p. 55.
186  Yoon, E., et al., “The State and Nongovernmental Organizations in Northeast Asia’s 
Environmental Security,” in The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and 
Cooperation over Energy, Resources, and Pollution, ed. by Schreurs, M. A. and Hyon, I.-T. 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
187  Jho, W. and Lee, H. (2009), p. 55.
188  For background in English, see East Asia Environmental Information Center (Tokyo: Asia 
3R Citizen’s Network), http://www.asia3r.net/en/link/eden-j.html. See also the sharing 
platform in three languages (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) Enviro Asia (East Asia 
Environmental Information Centre), http://www.enviroasia.info/
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networks. In spite of the severe and already-noted constraints on the ability 
of civil society organizations to affect state policy in East Asian countries, 
Yoon suggests:
Such informal social networks may facilitate official governmental level 
negotiation by opening dialogue on politically sensitive or ignored 
issues. NGOs also can play a role enhancing public awareness about the 
environment through information circulation, campaigns, and education 
programs. Grassroots actors may not be able to alter the fundamental 
distribution of power that explains the official and bureaucratic character 
of environmental politics in NEA today. Still, through the mobilization of 
social concern, civil society may achieve the goal of placing the environment 
higher on the NEA political agenda and slowly crack open a space for greater 
citizen participation in regional politics.189
In this state-centered political culture, civil society networks may still 
play a critically important ideational role by convening and supporting 
the emergence of epistemic communities in each culture that share an 
understanding of sustainability problems. As Jho and Lee argue, the 
yellow sand issue was first raised at an expert forum in 1988, and in 1992 an 
information cooperation network called the Northeast Asian Conference on 
Environmental Cooperation (NEAC) was formed by experts, civil society 
organizations, scholars, and research institutes. NEAC held fourteen 
regional meetings from 1992-2006.190 This group revealed facts about yellow 
sand and desertification that were previously unidentified and provided a 
rationale for a formal governmental investigation.191
Nonetheless, these early efforts by pioneering civil society environmental 
networks armed only with scientific information produced relatively few 
results. On yellow sand for example (whereby huge volumes of airborne 
dust laced with toxic materials are transported from inner Mongolia and 
the Mongolian desert across Korea and Japan, reaching all the way to 
North America), these networks succeeded in publicizing the issue and 
possible solutions. Yet they were unable to persuade governments to fund 
a proposed Northeast Asia Environment Cooperation Core Fund.192 
189  Yoon, E., “The Growth of Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Potential 
Roles of Civil Society,” The Good Society, 12(1) (2003), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/
gso.2003.0032
190  See Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (Tokyo: Environmental 
Cooperation Office, Japan Ministry of Environment, 2005), https://www.env.go.jp/
earth/coop/coop/neac_e.html
191  Jho, W. and Lee, H. (2009), p. 59. 
192  Ibid. 
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This shortfall suggested to Yasuo Takao that environmental and other 
single-issue networks needed to make common cause with cities and local 
governments engaged in their own transnational, networked activities 
as described above. Cities can provide the resources and a degree of 
accountability to civil society organizations that increase their autonomy for 
the central state. He argues that local governments are located strategically 
between transnationally linked local civil society organizations and central 
state governments.193 Exactly how this coordination would be achieved is 
not clear. Regional single-issue networks focused on air pollution, climate 
change, gender, etc., tend to emanate from the primary mega-city of each 
country, whereas many of the cross-border urban networks described 
by Takao are activated in second-tier cities, in part to compete with the 
primary capital city. We do not have a good picture of how these single-
issue networks work between South Korea and China or how they interact 
with nascent Chinese non-governmental organizations.194
In contrast, other civil society groups have managed to affect government 
policy. For example, at the center of the warzone — the Korean Demilitarized 
Zone — that forms the greatest barrier of all to the interlocking urban 
corridor stretching from Beijing to Tokyo, the DMZ Forum has set out to 
create a park. The goal of creating the park is to preserve biodiversity, restore 
Korean ecology and contribute to peacemaking, historical reconciliation, 
and cultural preservation by linking the Sorak, Keumkang, and Cheolwon 
regions north and south of the DMZ.195
This proposed peace park is at the center of the very same bio-
geographical region where the BeSeTo giga-city is emerging, along with 
a multi-sectoral network of geographers, botanists, and ecologists from 
government and private sector conservation organizations in each country 
of Northeast Asia. In meetings convened by the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in Bangkok, a 
regional inter-governmental organization proposed a set of trans-border 
biodiversity corridors through Mongolia, China, Russia, and North Korea. 
They want to ensure sufficient habitat remains for keystone and “flagship” 
species,196 the successful conservation of which would ensure that a host 
193  Takao, Y. (2003), pp. 78-79.
194  Xie, L., China’s Environmental Activism in the Age of Globalization (London: City University 
London, Department of International Politics, 2009). 
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of other species survive the emergence of the giga-city and its networked 
infrastructure, such as pipelines, roads, railways, and power lines. 
In turn, a biodiversity corridor that would link the northern habitat 
preservation zones with the DMZ Peace Park, and stretch southward to 
Jeju and on to Japan, has also been proposed by this author.197 As a result 
of the Forum’s work, key government officials in the United States and 
South Korean militaries have indicated they support a DMZ Peace Park 
and biodiversity conservation, although they have not yet managed to elicit 
a response from the North Korean side. 
Civil society networks have addressed other “hot” topics. These include 
the proposed Taiwan-North Korea nuclear waste deal198 and the marine oil 
pollution clean-up networks in which civil society organizations played an 
effective role either in stopping governments outright (as in the case of the 
nuclear waste deal) or in mobilizing massive, bottom-up civilian efforts to 
achieve what governments could not (as when confronted by the massive 
1997 oil spill off the western coast of Japan).199
Conclusion
This chapter presented an argument about the relationship between global 
problems, complexity, problem-solving, and East Asian civil society. In 
section 1, we asked what is “global” about a global problem and what 
makes it “problematic” in the first place. We reviewed categories of global 
problems — those that affect the sharing of global commons, those that 
affect our shared humanity, and those that rely on our shared rule book 
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for regulating human activity. We described the World Economic Forum’s 
map of high-impact, most-probable global risks. And we suggested that 
only by cross-border and cross-cultural dialogue and negotiation could 
we determine the priority and strategy for solving global problems via 
coordination and collaboration at a regional level in the form of jointly 
implemented, shared solutions. 
In section 2, we confronted complexity head-on. We suggested that the 
world is becoming not merely more complicated, but more complex in the 
sense that all realms of human existence are increasingly unpredictable, 
opaque and uncertain. We added that the possible emergence of the 
world’s first giga-city — a continuous city corridor stretching from Beijing 
to Tokyo — would make worse the already contradictory aspects of energy 
insecurity, urban insecurity, and nuclear insecurity, cross-cut by the 
challenges of climate change and the specific threat posed by an unstable, 
declining North Korea. 
Drawing on the work of Korean political scientists, we suggested 
that complex issues require a complex, networked response, organized 
transnationally across the region by states or by civil society. We examined 
cooperative environmental projects undertaken by inter-city, cross-
border networks linking Japan, South Korea, and China, and suggested 
that integrating the single-issue environmental and security civil society 
networks in future networks of local governments will create a new type of 
resilience in the region and generate new capacity for framing and solving 
global problems in spite of their complexity. 
We concluded this chapter by arguing that it is central to the role of 
civil society networks that they provide a critical perspective as to what 
constitutes the most urgent global problems that originate in or affect the 
region as a whole, rather than mirroring the priority problems set by states. 
Otherwise, civil society networks risk being entrapped in realpolitik zero-
sum games, rather than moving towards idealpolitik based on cooperative 
strategies. To this end, we will present detailed case studies of energy, 
urban, and nuclear insecurity in the next three chapters of this book. In 
each case, the nature of the core problem, the “center of gravity” of urban 
insecurity, climate change, energy insecurity, or nuclear insecurity, differs. 
As a starting point in mapping the complexity landscape, each chapter 
considers the extent to which the authors can identify common causes 
and shared solutions in the problem area and country of primary concern, 
across problems, and across borders. 
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This mapping is similar to any exploration of uncharted terrain. What 
is important is to identify multiple pathways between problems and 
solutions, to identify the high ground that can serve as navigation points 
in the future, and to find ways around barriers without having to climb 
over the highest peaks. In reality, there is little terrain left on Earth that has 
not been lived in before. The same is true of conceptual territory and of 
the corpus of specialized insight into specific problems. Thus, the question 
is not to uncover but to identify the paths not taken, while learning from 
those with intimate knowledge of the local ground. 
